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REGULATING PUBLICLY FUNDED PRIVATE SCHOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE ON EQUITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
ABSTRACT 
As school choice is an increasingly common feature of OECD education systems, the regulation of 
publicly funded private schools has become a salient concern for researchers and policy makers alike. 
Focussing on three areas of regulation – selective admission, add-on tuition fees and for-profit ownership – 
this paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature concerning their effects on equity 
and educational effectiveness. It also offers an overview of different countries’ approaches to the funding 
of private education and the methodological challenges involved in their empirical evaluation. The 
available evidence confirms that the funding of private schools has yielded widely different results across 
educational systems and suggests that regulatory frameworks are an important factor shaping these 
outcomes. Selective admission and substantial add-on tuition fees in particular are likely to exacerbate 
social segregation and can undermine schools’ incentives to compete on the basis of educational quality. 
The evidence on subsidised for-profit schools is equally divergent across countries but evidence points to 
the importance of rigorous accreditation processes and clear conditions concerning selectivity and fees to 
guide allocation of public funds. Although important questions are yet to be conclusively addressed, 
including the interaction of different regulatory devices and their effect on specific student groups, the 
existing literature suggests that private school regulation can make an important contribution to the equity 
and effectiveness of school choice programmes. 
RÉSUMÉ 
À mesure que le choix scolaire est une caractéristique des systèmes éducatifs de l'OCDE de plus en 
plus commune, la réglementation des écoles privées subventionnées par l’État est devenue une 
préoccupation saillante pour les chercheurs et les décideurs. En se concentrant sur trois domaines de la 
réglementation – l’admission sélective, les frais de scolarité et les établissements à but lucratif – ce rapport 
présente une revue de la littérature théorique et empirique concernant leurs effets sur l'équité et l'efficacité 
pédagogique. Il énumère également des approches différentes au financement des écoles privées et les 
défis méthodologiques impliqués dans leur évaluation empirique. Les données disponibles confirment que 
le financement de l'enseignement privé a donné des résultats très différents à travers les systèmes éducatifs 
et suggère que les cadres réglementaires sont un principal facteur affectant ces résultats. L’admission 
sélective et les frais de scolarité substantiels en particulier sont susceptibles d'aggraver la ségrégation 
sociale et de réduire les incitations des écoles de concourir sur la base de leur qualité éducative. Les 
données sur les écoles subventionnées à but lucratif sont également divergentes à travers des pays, mais ils 
soulignent l'importance d'un processus d'accréditation rigoureux et des conditions réglementaires en ce qui 
concerne leur qualité et sélectivité. Bien que des questions importantes doivent encore être abordées 
définitivement, la littérature existante suggère que la réglementation des écoles privées peut constituer une 
contribution importante à l'équité et l'efficacité des programmes de choix scolaire. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Publicly funded private schools and the design of school choice programmes 
Publicly funded private schools have become a prominent feature of many education systems across 
the OECD. More than two-thirds of OECD member countries have undertaken steps to increase parental 
school choice over the past 25 years (Musset, 2012) and by 2012, 13 OECD countries had a publicly 
funded private sector enrolling more than 10% of their 15-year-old students (OECD, 2013a, Table IV.4.7). 
Proponents of school choice consider the public funding of private education to be an effective way of 
expanding parental choice and enabling students to attend high-quality schools regardless of their financial 
means. Furthermore, publicly funding private schools has been suggested to stimulate inter-school 
competition and offer incentives for public and private schools alike to innovate, increase their quality, and 
become more efficient. Critics, on the other hand, have argued that school choice induces high-achieving 
and economically well-off students to leave the public sector, thereby exacerbating the stratification of 
students with respect to their socio-economic background and ability. As a consequence, funding private 
education might deplete the public sector of vital resources, leaving the schools unable to maintain an 
adequate educational quality. 
Reviews of the empirical literature on publicly funded private provision across different countries 
have usually found school choice to have small or insignificant mean effects on the achievement of 
students who make use of it (see Musset, 2012; Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015; Andersen, 2008). 
Evidence on the systemic effect of school choice on public school performance has been more favourable 
at times, but failed to establish a persistent relationship between competition and performance across 
different contexts (Sandström and Bergström, 2005; Rouse and Barrow, 2009; Dijkgraaf et al., 2012; 
Böhlmark and Lindahl, 2015). At the same time, both the theoretical and empirical literature has 
consistently stressed that the design of school choice programmes is critical for their success in generating 
effective competition while ensuring that all students can benefit from them regardless of their socio-
economic situation (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015: 40). 
A central question that has emerged in this debate is whether or not publicly funded private schools 
should be allowed to practice selective admission, charge add-on tuition fees, or operate for profit. 
Although the theoretical literature has generated strong hypotheses regarding all three aspects of school 
choice design, the empirical evidence on the subject has remained fragmented and largely confined to the 
study of funding schemes within a single country. By reviewing the empirical evidence on the subject from 
a cross-national perspective, this paper aims to show how the regulation of selective admission, tuition fees 
and for-profit ownership affects the success of school choice programmes. 
Section 2 of this review provides background information on the role of government-dependent 
private schools in OECD countries and the different mechanisms countries use to fund them. Drawing on 
theoretical and computational literature, Section 3 reviews the arguments surrounding school choice 
programmes and their hypothesised effects on student achievement in private and public schools, the 
aggregate performance of the school system, and student segregation. As this review will show, even the 
theoretical expectations regarding the effect of school choice are heavily dependent on the types of private 
schools that are eligible for public support. 
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Section 4 highlights some of the methodological challenges in the study of school choice and 
describes different techniques to address them. Sections 5 to 7 provide a review of the theoretical and 
computational research, individual countries’ policies, and the empirical evidence across three potential 
areas of private school regulation: selective admission, add-on tuition fees and for-profit ownership. Each 
of the three sections concludes with a summary of the empirical literature’s main findings, open questions 
and issues that merit the attention of future research. 
The empirical literature reviewed for this paper primarily draws on evidence from school choice 
programmes in OECD countries, particularly Chile and the United States, as well as Australia, Denmark 
and Sweden. The review focuses on studies published in English. 
1.2. Definitions 
1.2.1 Private schools 
In keeping with the OECD’s definition, this review distinguishes between private and public schools 
on the basis of their management control, as opposed to the source of their funding or the ownership over 
their buildings and site. Consistent with the UNESCO/OECD/EUROSTAT (UOE) data collection on 
educational statistics,
1
 the OECD classifies an educational institution as private if it is “controlled and 
managed by a non-governmental organisation (e.g. a church, a trade union or a business enterprise, foreign 
or international agency), or its governing board consists mostly of members not selected by a public 
agency” (UOE, 2015: 24). The decisive factor in determining the status of schools is therefore the actor 
who has “overall control” over the school, which is defined as “the power to determine the general policies 
and activities of the institution and to appoint the officers managing the school.” This control usually 
extends to the decision of opening or closing an institution (OECD, 2004: 58). 
Classifying public and private schools across countries is complicated by the varying extent of public 
and private involvement in the management of schools. In some countries, the hiring practices, curricula, 
examinations and admission of privately managed schools are regulated to nearly the same extent as those 
of public schools. In other countries, public schools have extensive educational and fiscal autonomy, 
vested in school governing boards with private members. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this review, 
these schools will be classified as privately and publicly managed respectively. 
The US Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics employs a different 
definition of private schools based on their primary source of funding. A private school is thus defined as 
“a school that is not supported primarily by public funds” (Broughman and Swaim, 2013, Appendix A). 
Data on private schools in the United States drawn from the questionnaire of the 2009 Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) therefore does not reflect their management model, but refer to 
privately funded schools (OECD, 2012a: 23). 
This is particularly significant considering the growing number of charter schools, which were 
permitted to operate in 41 US states and the District of Columbia by August 2015 (Epple, Romano and 
Zimmer, 2015: 2). Charter schools are primarily funded with public resources and subject to oversight by 
state-designated charter school authorisers but may be privately managed (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 
2015: 2). In line with US state requirements, charter schools are considered as public schools by the 
                                                     
1 
The UOE data collection is jointly administered by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation Institute for Statistics (UNESCO-UIS), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the Statistical Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT). 
EDU/WKP(2016)21 
 8 
OECD, although they can be managed by private institutions and operate under similar restrictions to 
admission and tuition fees as private schools under voucher programmes
2
 elsewhere (ibid.). 
In order to make use of OECD’s comparative international data and remain consistent with previous 
reports on private education as well as the majority of existing scientific literature, the UOE classification 
will be used throughout this review. Although charter schools will therefore be considered as public 
schools, the paper will draw on selected studies of charter schools given the important characteristics they 
share with publicly funded private schools elsewhere. 
1.2.2 Publicly funded private schools 
Since – according to the management-based definition – the status of private schools is conceptually 
independent of their funding,
3
 they can receive financial resources from both private and public sources. 
The UOE therefore further distinguishes between government-independent and government-dependent 
private schools. Government-independent private schools are those that receive less than half of their core 
funding from government agencies and whose teaching personnel are not paid by a government agency, 
while government-dependent private schools are the ones that either receive 50% or more of their core 
funding from government agencies or whose teaching personnel is funded by a government agency 
(OECD, 2004: 59). In this context, core funding refers to “the funds that support the basic or core 
educational services of the institutions”, excluding the funding of research projects, services purchased or 
contracted by private organisations, and any fees or subsidies received for ancillary services (e.g. meals or 
lodging in boarding schools). Tuition fees that are paid by students fall under the scope of public funding 
as long as they are financed by conditional government vouchers or loans (OECD, 2004: 59). 
                                                     
2
 School vouchers are “certificates issued by the government with which parents can pay for the education of their 
children at a school of their choice” (OECD, 2012a: 34). They are one of the most common mechanisms 
for the public funding of private providers and school choice in general. 
3 
Leaving aside the aforementioned exception of schools in the United States. 
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2. APPROACHES TO FUNDING PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
2.1 The extent of public funding for private education 
2.1.1 Size of the government-dependent private sector 
On average across OECD countries in 2012, 14.2% of 15-year-old students attended government-
dependent private schools, 81.7% attended public schools and 4.1% attended independent private schools 
(see Figure 1). The publicly funded private sector comprises more than 10% of the student population of 
13 OECD countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Chile, the United Kingdom, Korea, Australia, 
Spain, Denmark, France, Hungary, Sweden and Luxembourg). Notably, in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Ireland and Chile, more students are enrolled in government-dependent private schools than in public 
schools (OECD, 2013a, Table IV.4.7). 
Figure 1. Percentage of students at age 15, by type of institution, 2012 
 
Note: 1. Excluding independent private schools. 
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of students enrolled in government-dependent private education. 
Source: OECD (2013a), PISA 2012 Results: What Makes a School Successful? (Volume IV): Resources, Policies and Practices, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201156-en. 
Between 2003 and 2012, several OECD countries saw an increase in government-dependent private 
school enrolment. Most notably, Sweden experienced a ten percentage point drop in the share of 
15-year-old public school students and a corresponding increase in the share of students attending 
government-dependent private schools. In Poland, government-dependent private schools quadrupled their 
share of students between 2003 and 2012, increasing their market share from 0.4% to 1.9% with a 
corresponding decrease in public school enrolment. In the OECD partner country Indonesia, the 
independent private school sector shrunk at the expense of a 13 percentage point increase in the student 
share of government-dependent private schools. Government-dependent private schools in Hungary made 
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gains of six percentage points at the expense of both public and independent private schools. By contrast, 
Finland, the Slovak Republic and Spain saw a four percentage point drop in the proportion of students 
attending government-dependent private schools, while the enrolment in public schools increased by the 
same magnitude (OECD, 2014: 408, Tables C7.2, C7.3). 
2.1.2 Level of public funding for privately managed schools 
Given the cross-country variation in the relative size of the government-dependent and government-
independent private school sectors, there are also pronounced differences in the amount of public funding 
received by the average private school. Across OECD countries, the principals of privately managed 
schools (including government-independent private schools) reported to receive on average 57.6% of their 
total school funding from government sources, including departments, local, regional state and national 
authorities, compared to 89.2% among publicly managed schools (see Figure 2). In 10 out of 29 OECD 
countries, privately managed schools receive on average more than 80% of their funding from the 
government and an additional 8 member states receive more than 50% from public sources. Countries with 
very high levels of public funding among privately managed schools include Sweden (99.6%), Finland 
(97.4%), the Netherlands (96.4%) and the Slovak Republic (91.9%) as well as the partner economy Hong 
Kong, China (91.3%). By contrast, countries in which private schools receive low levels of public funding 
include New Zealand (9.6%), Greece, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States (all below 1.0%) 
as well as partner countries and economies such as Colombia (20.4%); Chinese Taipei (8.8%); Kazakhstan 
(3.6%); and Shanghai, China (3.4%) (OECD, 2012a, Table B1.4: 83). 
Figure 2. Proportion of school funding from government sources, by type of institution, 2009 
 
Note: Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of private school funding from government sources. 
Source: OECD (2012a), Public and Private Schools: How Management and Funding Relate to their Socio-economic Profile, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264175006-en. 
2.1.3 Level of public funding per student 
The amount of public funding private schools receive has important implications for the financial 
incentives informing their behaviour. In order to provide schools with financial incentives to attract more 
students by improving their quality, the amount of public contributions must depend on the number of 
enrolled students (Goldhaber, 2009: 313). Many countries condition the funding for government-dependent 
private schools on the number of students they serve as well as the average or estimated cost of educating a 
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student in public schools. In other countries, government-dependent private schools receive considerably 
less funding than their public counterparts and are sometimes allowed to charge parents tuition fees in 
order to make up for this discrepancy. 
In order to induce school competition, Goldhaber (2009) argues, the contributions private schools 
receive per student must be greater or equal to the marginal cost of educating a student so as to not make 
the school benefit financially from reducing its student number. At the same time, if vouchers exceed the 
variable cost of education, “loosing students will leave public schools with diminished financial capacity to 
educate the students who remain” and potentially unable to implement the changes necessary to improve 
their teaching quality (Goldhaber, 2009: 313). 
In the United States, many regional voucher programmes provide private schools with grants that are 
considerably below the average spending per student and therefore “far less than would provide financial 
incentives of any consequence to schools that are losing students” (Goldhaber: 2009: 316). These voucher 
programmes therefore do not provide ideal conditions to test the effect of vouchers on marked-based 
competition. 
2.2 The governance and distribution of funding for private education 
There is considerable variation in the governance of school funding both across and within OECD 
countries. Financial resources for schools can be levied at different administrative levels and stem from tax 
revenues, foregone revenues (e.g. in the form of tax reductions), or private contributions. Public funding 
can be allocated to individual schools based on funding formulas, targeted programmes, historic funding 
mechanisms, or the exercise of administrative discretion (see Fazekas, 2012). The funding can be used to 
cover selected components of the school budget, such as operating expenditure, maintenance cost, or 
capital investments. 
In most systems, schools receive their funding through a combination of these pathways and many 
countries use different mechanisms to distribute resources among public schools and government-
dependent private schools. In countries where private schools receive less public funding than is needed to 
fund their teaching activities, they might – subject to the countries’ legal regulations – supplement their 
resources by charging tuition fees, receiving donations and voluntary parents’ contributions, or with the 
financial support of denominational providers. 
Mechanisms for the public financing of private education can be classified as either demand-side or 
supply-side oriented. Both supply-side and demand-side subsidies can be a means to expand parental 
choice and to introduce market-based competition between schools by tying the amount of funding they 
receive (either directly or via parents) to the number of students each school can attract. 
 Supply-side subsidies are directly provided to the operators of private schools. Examples for 
supply-side subsidies include tax reductions or exemptions for private school operators as well as 
public grants for operating and personnel expenses or capital investments. 
 Demand-side subsidies are provided to households taking advantage of private education. 
Examples for demand-side subsidies include universal and targeted vouchers as well as tax 
credits or tax deductions used to reimburse families for their expenditure on private education. 
 Funding mechanisms for private schools can be further distinguished based on the scale at which they 
operate and whether they are universal or targeted. The scale and universality of school choice 
programmes has important consequences for their expected impact on individual student groups as well as 
their system level effects which will be elaborated in Section 3. 
EDU/WKP(2016)21 
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 Local and national programmes: Some funding mechanisms are geographically restricted, 
limiting the schools and students who are eligible for public subsidies to those in a given city, 
municipality or state. In other cases, school choice schemes have been implemented countrywide. 
 Universal and targeted subsidies: Funding schemes also differ with respect to the criteria they 
use to define students’ and schools’ eligibility for public subsidies. Some funding arrangements 
restrict or vary the amount of public funding based on student characteristics (e.g. their 
socio-economic status) or allocate public subsidies conditional on schools characteristics 
(e.g. vouchers might be restricted to students in underperforming schools). Open enrolment and 
universal voucher programmes, on the other hand, place minimal or no restrictions on the 
children and schools eligible for public support. 
The empirical evaluation of small and large scale financing programmes are each associated with 
specific advantages and drawbacks, which need to be considered when drawing on evidence from either of 
the two: “Small scale experiments are appealing in providing strong statistical identification, but do not 
always isolate mechanisms (e.g. peer effects, differences in expenditure per student) and leave open the 
issue of scalability. Large scale programmes provide scope for assessment of the effects of vouchers in 
practice, but identification is a greater challenge due to potential selection effects and associated 
differential peer effects (and, sometimes, to potential confounding effects of contemporaneous policy 
changes)” (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015: 56). 
2.2.1 Vouchers and tuition tax credits in OECD countries 
Vouchers are a commonly used instrument to finance private education at all school levels. As of 
2009, 9 out of 22 OECD countries with available data reported to facilitate the attendance of government-
dependent private primary schools with vouchers. In five of these, the voucher programme was restricted 
to students with lower socio-economic background. At the lower secondary level, 11 out of 24 countries 
reported to operate voucher schemes, 7 of which targeted disadvantaged students. At the upper secondary 
level, 5 of 11 voucher programmes were means tested. Of the surveyed OECD countries, 7 reported to 
provide vouchers all the way from primary through to upper secondary education (OECD, 2011, 
Table D5.14). 
Tuition tax credits, which allow parents to deduct expenses on private school tuition from their tax 
liabilities, are used less frequently than vouchers. As of 2009, only 3 out of 26 OECD countries with 
available data reported to use tax credits to facilitate the attendance of government-dependent private 
schools (OECD, 2011, Table D5.16). The advantages and drawbacks of different tax reduction 
programmes are discussed below. 
2.2.2 Tax reduction programmes and equity  
In general, tax reduction programmes allow parents to reduce their taxes to make up for expenses on 
private school tuition. This provides governments with an instrument to finance private education through 
forgone revenue by incentivising parents to send their children to private schools and pay tuition when they 
would not have otherwise chosen or been able to do so (OECD, 2012a: 34). A distinction can be made 
between programmes based on tax credits, which directly reduce the claimant’s tax liability by a specified 
amount, and those based on tax deductions, which indirectly reduce the tax burden by decreasing the 
amount of taxable income. 
The effect of tax deductions and tax credits varies according to the claimants’ level of income, which 
has important implications for the equitability of funding programmes. Since tax credits directly reduce the 
claimants’ payable tax by a specified amount, they benefit everyone to the same extent as long as their tax 
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liability is at least the size of the credit. Tax deductions, on the other hand, reduce the claimants’ taxable 
income, which means that the actual savings are a function of their marginal income tax rate. Since – under 
progressive taxation regimes – the marginal tax rate increases with income, deductions will benefit 
high-income taxpayers more than those with lower incomes. 
In their study of tax deduction and tax credit programmes in Minnesota, Darling-Hammond et al. 
(1985) find that tax deductions disproportionately benefited parents with higher incomes and educational 
levels while contributing little to widening private school access: “Rather than expanding choice for those 
parents at the margin, the deduction appears to subsidise the choices of those who have already selected 
private schools” (Darling-Hammond et al., 1985: 51). Based on a parent survey, they argue that the 
educational choices of low-income families were more likely to be affected by policies such as 
transportation subsidies, which are less complex and address the immediate cost of private school 
attendance (Darling-Hammond et al., 1985). Reviewing more recent empirical evidence on the effects of 
tax credit and tax deduction programmes, Huerta and d’Entremont confirm that “tax deduction programs 
disproportionately benefit wealthier families” whereas Minnesota’s tax credit programme was more 
equitable, benefiting particularly low-income families, although it came with a higher per-participant cost 
and a relatively modest take-up (Huerta and d’Entremont, 2007: 97). 
2.2.3 Policies regulating eligibility for public subsidies 
The design of school choice programmes – in particular the eligibility requirements for participating 
private schools – has been identified as a key determinant of their success (Epple, Romano and 
Urquiola, 2015: 40; Ladd, 2002: 20). Regardless of whether public subsidies are allocated to private 
schools using demand-side or supply-side instruments, governments can impose conditions that schools 
must fulfil in order to be eligible for financial support. Some of these conditions, such as the providers’ 
official recognition or accreditation, can in turn be subject to various requirements pertaining to quality 
(e.g. staff-child ratios or staff qualifications), curricula, parental involvement, and the participation in 
assessment and evaluation practices.
4
 
Restricting the eligibility of private schools to receive public support may serve explicit policy 
objectives, such as diminishing inequities arising from school choice or ensuring that inter-school 
competition leads to an increase in school quality. A World Bank report by Lewis and Patrinos (2011), for 
example, recommends that school choice should be “accompanied by mitigating factors to ensure choice 
does not lead to segregation”, including, for example, non-selective admission criteria and no compulsory 
add-on fees (Lewis and Patrinos, 2011: 8). Similarly, Alves et al. (2015) suggest that the regulation of 
tuition fees and student selection may explain the different degrees of inequity observed in the Brazilian 
and Chilean school choice programmes. Epple, Romano and Urquiola (2015) equally conclude that “the 
details of program design clearly matter” for ensuring the positive outcomes of school choice (2015: 40), 
supporting simulation studies that have highlighted the importance of regulating private school pricing and 
admission (Epple and Romano, 2012). 
An alternative to restricting private schools’ eligibility for public support is to adjust the amount of 
funding they receive. The size of voucher might, for example, be adjusted to reflect its students’ 
characteristics (e.g. disadvantaged students receiving larger vouchers) or features of the school they attend 
                                                     
4
 According to Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, of 23 countries with available data, 17 “reported that 
all government-dependent private schools participate in national examinations and another three countries 
reported that between 76% and 99% of their government-dependent private schools participate” and even 
where participation is optional “the vast majority” of publicly funded private schools tend to take part 
(OECD, 2015a, p. 476 and Table D6.1). Likewise, there is widespread participation in national assessments 
without stakes for students (OECD, 2015a, Table D6.10). 
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(e.g. rewarding schools with an economically integrated student body) (Ladd, 2002: 19). These 
two approaches – restricting the use of vouchers or adjusting their amount – should not be considered as 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, Ladd (2002: 20) stresses that “even for means-tested programs […], design 
matters”, since disadvantaged families may not benefit from vouchers if they are exceeded by tuition fees 
or if parental interviews and other selection mechanisms restrict the entry of disadvantaged students. 
In particular, three areas have received extensive attention in the theoretical and empirical literature: 
selective admission, add-on tuition fees and for-profit ownership. An overview of different country 
practices in each of these areas and a review of their impact on efficiency and equity is presented in 
Sections 5, 6 and 7. 
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3. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PUBLICLY FUNDING PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
The argument for school choice was most prominently put forward by Friedman (1962), who 
suggested that providing each student with a specified amount of money to spend at a public or private 
school of their choice “would make for more effective competition among various types of schools and for 
a more efficient utilisation of their resources” as schools would try to attract students (Friedman, 1962). At 
the same time, school choice was argued to reduce inequalities stemming from residential segregation and 
allow students from poor neighbourhoods to attend high-quality schools outside of their district or private 
institutions that they could not have otherwise afforded. 
Opponents of school choice programmes criticise their negative impact on public schools, warning 
that students leaving public schools for private alternatives would replete them of vital resources and 
impede their ability to provide adequate teaching services for the remaining students. Furthermore, the 
literature suggests that market incentives and competitive pressures alone might not be sufficient to 
increase public schools’ standards where structural factors such as weak district and school leadership limit 
their capacity to implement reforms (Goldhaber, 2009: 311). Critics also point out that the students making 
use of school choice will, on average, be of higher ability and socio-economic background than those who 
do not. This could not only exacerbate student segregation, but also aggravate existing resource imbalances 
since disadvantaged students are more costly to educate and public schools already more frequently report 
resource shortages than government-dependent private schools.
5
 
3.1 Educational effectiveness and efficiency 
 In this review, the concept of effectiveness refers to a school system’s capacity to accomplish a given 
set of educational objectives (e.g. improving student achievement) while efficiency refers to the ability to 
achieve these objectives at the lowest possible cost. Other things being equal, a school system is therefore 
considered to be more efficient if it generates a higher output level using a given set of resource inputs or 
achieves the same results using fewer resources (see Lockheed and Hanushek, 1994). 
3.1.1 Effects on school systems’ effectiveness 
The public funding of private education has been suggested to increase the effectiveness of school 
systems through at least three distinct mechanisms: by altering the relative size of the private and public 
school sectors, by increasing student segregation, and by fostering school competition. 
First, using public funding to facilitate access to private schools is likely to lead to a movement of 
students from the public to the private sector. If private schools are more effective than public schools, 
increasing the relative size of the private sector is expected to yield a system-wide improvement in school 
effectiveness. 
Second, particularly where schools can select students based on their ability, expanding parental 
choice is likely to increase the stratification of students across schools. Depending on the way peer effects 
                                                     
5
 PISA data from 2012 shows that principals of public schools more frequently reported teacher shortages than those 
of government-dependent private schools in 15 of 24 OECD countries, with principals in 3 countries 
reporting similar levels (OECD, 2014, Table C7.4). 
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condition the achievement of students at different points of the ability distribution, the aggregate effect of 
ability segregation on student performance and school effectiveness can be positive or negative. Although 
empirical evidence on peer effects suggests that low-achieving students tend to suffer from increased 
sorting, research on the system-wide net effect of sorting has been largely inconclusive (see Section 5.5). 
Distinct from these peer effects, increased student homogeneity through ability sorting has been argued to 
improve student outcomes across the ability spectrum since it allows teaching practices to be more 
effectively tailored to the learners’ needs (see Duflo et al., 2011).  
Third, increasing parental choice might lead to performance gains by inducing market pressures and 
competition into the school system. It is suggested that public schools would employ their resources more 
effectively or increase their effort and – by extension – their quality, if threatened with the loss of students 
and resources to private schools. This mechanism is based on the assumption that parents opt for 
higher-quality schools and thereby incentivise providers to compete for students by improving their 
quality. However, school quality (here understood as the value added to their students’ educational 
outcomes) is difficult to observe in practice. Parents might therefore rely on heuristics such as choosing the 
school with the highest average test score or an intake of students with high socio-economic status, thereby 
incentivising schools to engage in selective admission practices, rather than improving their quality. 
Although not all parents need to make perfectly informed school choices to generate effective competition, 
the fact that information about school quality is unevenly distributed may exacerbate social inequalities 
(see Schneider et al., 1998, 2000). Furthermore, factors besides educational quality, such as the schools’ 
location, non-educational amenities, curricula with a cultural or linguistic focus and particular pedagogical 
approaches may also play an important role in parents’ school choices. While competition can thus in 
theory result in higher quality and diversity, not all grounds on which schools may compete for students 
are aligned with education policy objectives. 
3.1.2 Effects on school systems’ efficiency 
Proponents of school choice have argued that injecting competition into the school system would put 
an end to local public schools’ monopoly on compulsory education and thereby force them to use their 
resources more efficiently. In a widely cited study, Hoxby (2000a) reported increased competition among 
public schools in the United States to lower public spending while simultaneously raising student 
achievement. However, these findings have since been challenged both theoretically and empirically. 
Subsequent analyses of the same data have found the cost-reducing effects to be highly sensitive to 
methodological choices and the specification of key variables (Rothstein, 2007). Looking specifically at 
the competition between private and public schools, Andersen and Serritzlew (2007) also found that 
Danish districts increased their expenditure per student when faced with private school competition 
without causing a corresponding rise in student performance. Similar findings have been reported from 
Sweden (see Lindbohm [2010] for a review), although several methodological difficulties render the 
assessment of educational cost efficiency difficult in practice (see Section 4.3). 
Houlberg et al. (2016: 79) provide three reasons why the public funding of private schools may have 
perverse effects on public spending: One reason for the higher expenditure level may be that public schools 
face difficulties in planning and organising their provision if they can no longer count on stable student 
numbers. Reductions in public school attendance might leave public schools with overcapacities and high 
fixed costs. Another reason could be an increase in staff expenditure if public and private schools have to 
compete for teachers. Finally, public schools may need to allocate more resources to sending costly signals 
to parents when faced with competition, including investments into school buildings or lower class sizes, 
which do not necessarily translate into higher student performance. 
Publicly funding private schools might also give rise to inefficiencies in the school network. 
Providing financial incentives for the entry of private schools can lead to a reduction in the average class 
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and school size both due to school fragmentation as well as the smaller average class size in lower 
secondary government-dependent private schools (OECD, 2014, Table D2.1). This is likely to increase 
per-student expenditure due to the relative increase in fixed costs without necessarily improving student 
learning outcomes – an effect that has, for example, been observed in Estonia (Santiago et al., 2016). 
Depending on the criteria governing the opening and closing of public and private schools, the 
funding of private schools may also undermine efforts to increase efficiency through school consolidation. 
Municipal leaders in Denmark, for example, have reported that the closure of public schools in some rural 
areas has prompted parents to set up a new private school in the same location. Additionally, where 
students respond to mergers or school closures by moving to private schools, the number of students in the 
newly consolidated public schools might be lower than anticipated and therefore fail to generate the 
desired efficiency gains (Houlberg et al., 2016: 60). Lowering the entry barriers for private schools might 
thereby “affect […] the possibilities for establishing an economically efficient municipal school structure” 
(ibid.: 106), which is a particularly pertinent concern in systems that are already characterised by 
overcapacity (Santiago et al., 2016: 139). 
Other potential inefficiencies arising from the financing of private schools largely depend on the 
particular programme’s regulatory characteristics and funding arrangements. Potential concerns, especially 
for non-means tested programmes include, for example, the deadweight loss of financing the private school 
expenses of families who would have paid for their children’s attendance, even in the absence of public 
support. 
3.1.3 Effects on pedagogical innovation and diversity in the school offer 
Proponents of publicly financing private schools argue that intensifying competition between public 
and private schools would result in a more diverse offer of educational institutions and pedagogical 
strategies as schools specialise and cater to more narrowly defined educational preferences. In addition, 
this sorting by preferences has been suggested to make it easier for schools to resolve conflicts among 
stakeholders, which in turn allows them to focus on their teaching activities (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Hill et 
al., 1997). 
Relatively little research has investigated the effect of private school funding on educational 
innovation, yet a review of market-based reforms by Lubienski (2009) concluded that economic forces 
have tended to promote standardisation rather than experimentation with regards to classroom practices. 
Although market pressures may lead schools to adopt new management and marketing techniques and to 
be more responsive to parents’ preferences, many of them appear to favour traditional over innovative 
curricular and pedagogical approaches. If a diversification of the educational offer did take place, 
Lubienski concludes, it often resulted in a “hierarchical ordering of institutions, rather than a horizontal 
range of equally valued, but substantively different […] approaches” (Lubienski, 2009: 43). 
Others have pointed to the limited capacity of low-performing schools to improve their 
competitiveness by means of innovation. Hirsch (2002) argues that schools that fail to attract sufficient 
numbers of students and would therefore have the most to gain from innovation often lack the resources to 
implement them. School choice, he suggests, might therefore be “just as likely to discourage educational 
innovation for fear of losing support from parents who are wary about risking their children’s futures on 
educational experiments whose results are uncertain” (Hirsch, 2002: 33). Alternative strategies to foster 
innovation could aim to “embolden schools to specialise and experiment" and "encourage diversity among 
schools that are succeeding, rather than those that are failing” by facilitating inter-school collaboration and 
“rewarding schools that pioneer curriculum or other initiatives and which have benefits across the system” 
(Hirsch, 2002: 33). 
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3.1.4 Effects on parental involvement 
Hill et al. (1997) point to another desirable consequence of publicly funding private schools, arguing 
that the act of school choice itself can improve students and parents’ relationship towards educational 
institutions. Although the empirical evidence remains scant they identified a number of mechanisms 
through which this effect might operate, which Schneider et al. (2000) summarise as follows: “1) Schools 
of choice can influence students’ attitudes, effort and motivation in ways that "regular" schools cannot. 
2) Schools of choice have more authority and legitimacy. 3) Choice holds schools accountable to promises 
made, thereby allowing the development of effective school communities that link teachers and 
administrators together. 4) Through their act of choice, parents have endorsed the school they have chosen 
as better than the alternatives, leading to higher levels of satisfaction and a stronger commitment to the 
school.” 
3.2 Socio-economic stratification 
In theory, vouchers and other school choice programmes enable students from families of low 
socio-economic status who are stuck in poorly-performing public schools to seek out more highly 
performing educational alternatives and thereby allowing them a form of mobility that might otherwise be 
restricted to families who can afford private schools or residential mobility (Neal, 2002; Sugarman, 1999).  
Figure 3. Differences in socio-economic status between public and private schools students, 2012 
As measured by the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status, students in public schools = 0 
 
Notes: Statistically significant differences are marked by darker bars and lighter markers. 
Countries are ranked in descending order of the difference between government-dependent private and public schools' score on the 
PISA index of economic, social and cultural status 
Only countries with available data on government-dependent private schools all are displayed. The OECD average takes into account 
all countries with available data on private schools. 
Source: OECD (2014), Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2014-en. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 3, government-dependent private schools tend to serve more 
socio-economically advantaged students than public schools in nearly all OECD countries – as is the case 
for private schools more generally. Across OECD countries, results from PISA 2012 show that, on 
average, the students of privately managed schools had a more favourable economic, social and cultural 
status (ESCS) than students of public schools (by around 0.5 points in the PISA index of ESCS, which is 
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based on parents’ years of education, occupational status and home possessions). The same pattern – 
although slightly less pronounced – can be observed for publicly funded private schools: on average, the 
value for students attending government-dependent private schools was 0.3 points higher than for public 
school students. Only in 2 of 23 OECD countries with available data did public school students have a 
higher socio-economic status than those of publicly funded private schools.  
This pattern of student stratification threatens to undermine the role of education in advancing equity 
and social cohesion. To explain this phenomenon, studies have put forward a range of mechanisms 
pertaining to both demand-side and supply-side responses to school choice. 
3.2.1 Stratification due to differential take-up rates and preferences 
On the demand side, several factors may dispose better-informed and socio-economically advantaged 
families to make use of school choice systems more frequently or in a more competent way (Schneider et 
al., 2000). Interviews with public high school students in Chicago suggest that many of them failed to take 
advantage of school choice programmes either because they were discouraged by travelling costs or 
because they faced difficulties in the application process, missed deadlines, failed to meet entrance 
requirements, and submitted incomplete or too few applications to selective schools (Stevens et al., 2011). 
Parental involvement and school counselling was therefore shown to drastically improve students’ 
engagement in the choice programme, which highlights the importance of tackling information deficiencies 
and the inequities arising from parents’ varying capacity to help their children navigate complex 
application procedures. 
In response to these concerns, some countries publicly disclose information on school performance in 
order to empower students and parents to make informed choices based on the quality of schools. In 
Estonia, for example, the Ministry of Education and Research publishes key data on schools using a public 
Internet portal (Santiago et al., 2016). Since raw achievement data can be difficult to interpret in terms of a 
school’s value added (i.e. its contribution to students’ performance net of their initial ability), some 
reporting systems try to increase comparability by accounting for factors that lie beyond the schools’ 
control. The My School website (www.myschool.edu.au), launched in 2010 by the Australian Curriculum 
Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), therefore allows parents to compare a school’s 
performance in the national assessment (NAPLAN) and their students’ gains over time to both the national 
average and a group of comparable schools. This reference group consist of schools with statistically 
similar student characteristics (parental education and occupation) and school community factors 
(proportion of indigenous students, remoteness of the school and a measure of educational disadvantage for 
students with a language background other than English) (OECD, 2013b: 462). Nevertheless, parents’ 
responses to the release of school quality information have been shown to vary by socio-economic status 
and to be constrained by existing spatial inequalities in the access to high-quality schooling (Rich and 
Jennings, 2015). 
3.2.2 Stratification due to implicit and explicit student selection 
On the supply side, stratification may arise if publicly funded private schools engage in implicit or 
explicit student selection at the point of admission to save costs and attract other students hoping to benefit 
from a high-achieving peer group (Hsieh and Urqiuola, 2006; Levin, 2002). As will be further discussed in 
Section 5, this practice can increase student segregation and might occur for a number of reasons unless 
appropriate restrictions are put in place: in the absence of perfect information on school quality, parents are 
likely to use student composition as a heuristic for a school’s value added, which in turn incentivises 
schools to select high-performing students. In addition, high-performing and socio-economically 
advantaged students are less costly to educate and therefore provide schools with an opportunity to cut 
costs if they receive the same amount of funding for each student regardless of their ability.  
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3.3 Simulation-based literature 
The debate on publicly funded private schools and the design of school vouchers has given rise to a 
rich literature using theoretical models and simulations to explore the potential effects of different funding 
regimes. In their review of recent advances in the computational literature on vouchers,  
Epple and Romano (2012) highlight the short-comings of “laissez-faire flat-rate vouchers”, arguing that 
voucher design (including restrictions on private school pricing and admission) plays a critical role in 
ensuring that school choice policies improve educational outcomes for all. A number of theoretical works, 
including MacLeod and Urquiola, (2009) and Epple and Romano (1998 and 2008) have demonstrated that 
the public funding of private schools may – unless targeted at particular student groups or accompanied by 
restrictions on private schools’ admission and tuition policies – increase educational inequality and even 
reduce aggregate student achievement, rather than improving access and increasing school quality through 
competition. Insights from these theoretical models will be reviewed and discussed in more detail in 
Sections 5, 6 and 7. When interpreting the results of such theoretical models, though, it is important to bear 
in mind limitations to their external validity, given that their findings rest on assumptions which may not 
fully hold in all or any of the countries under study. 
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4. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF SCHOOL CHOICE 
Generating robust evidence on the effect of publicly funding private schools is complicated by a range 
of methodological challenges. Before reviewing the empirical literature, we therefore draw attention to 
some of these difficulties and provide examples of strategies to address them. This section thereby 
introduces some of the criteria against which the quality of existing studies will be assessed, while also 
providing an overview of terms and methods that will be referred to throughout the remainder of the 
review.  
4.1 Identifying the impact of private, for-profit, or selective education on student performance 
Discussions on the desirability of private education often appeal to their positive effects on student 
achievement. As Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) point out, this “effect of education” can either refer to 
the “average treatment effect” (ATE) which denotes the average effect private school attendance has or 
would have on a random individual, and the “average effect of treatment on the treated” (ATT), which 
denotes the average effect of private schools on those who actually attended one. Most empirical studies of 
private school effects are designed to identify the ATT, rather than the ATE – which is challenging 
enough, as will be discussed in the following. However, policy makers are often not only interested in the 
population that received a certain treatment such as private school attendance, but also those which might 
receive it. When considering expanding the private sector, for example, it may not be safe to assume that 
private school attendance will have the same effect on those who newly join as it does on those who 
already attend a private school. Hypothetically, if private schools are mainly attended by students with high 
expected gains from such provisions, the ATT would not provide a good estimate of the ATE – even if the 
latter were correctly identified – and overestimate the expected impact of private sector expansion 
(Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004: 489). 
Estimating the effect of private school attendance usually involves comparisons between students 
attending such schools and those who do not. If the only initial difference between these two groups were 
the type of school they chose to attend, any divergence in their later learning outcomes could be ascribed to 
the effect of private schooling. Yet, students enrolled in different school types tend to differ with regards to 
a range of both observed and unobserved characteristics. 
4.1.1 Observed differences between private and public school students 
If differences between the student populations of private and public schools are systematically 
correlated with their performance, comparing the raw data of student achievement across school types and 
attributing any differences to the effect of schools will yield biased estimates. For instance, although 
15-year-old private school students had significantly higher PISA mathematics scores in 27 of 45 countries 
and economies with available data, this advantage “is no longer observed in most countries/economies 
when the socio-economic status of students and schools are taken into account” (OECD, 2014: 410). The 
same concerns apply to the comparison of expenditures across school types since private schools tend to 
cater to fewer students with special educational needs or socio-economic disadvantages, who are more 
costly to educate (Ladd, 2002: 12). 
Standard regression techniques allow researchers to control for observed variables that might 
confound the relationship between the independent (school type) and the dependent variable 
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(e.g. performance). Many studies using ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) control for observed 
differences among student characteristics at the individual level, or – where individual achievement data is 
not available, e.g. in Chile prior to 1997 – aggregate characteristics at the school level (e.g. McEwan and 
Carnoy, 2000). However, these techniques do not address the problem of unobserved confounders and 
selection bias. 
4.1.2 Selection on unobserved student characteristics 
When using regression techniques to estimate the effect of school attendance on performance, 
coefficients may be subject to omitted variable bias if the equation’s error term is correlated with one or 
more of the independent variables (here, the choice of a particular school type). This problem may arise 
wherever private schools select their students on the basis of socio-economic status (e.g. through tuition 
fees) or ability (e.g. through admission tests) but also where the selection is more subtle or based on 
choices made by parents. The decision to send children to private schools might, for example, be an 
expression of the importance parents attach to their children’s education. If these unobserved factors are 
positively correlated with students’ academic performance and remain uncontrolled for, any positive 
effects of private school attendance are likely to be overestimated. Even if studies could control for 
students’ performance prior to attending private school, which is rarely possible, unobserved differences 
affecting their future performance may remain. 
Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) discuss three methods to address selection bias caused by 
unobserved confounders: instrumental variables, Heckman correction models and propensity score 
matching. In their review of studies analysing the impact of public-private partnerships in education, 
Patrinos et al. (2009: 36) discuss three more strategies: randomisation, regression discontinuity analysis 
and difference-in-differences estimators. Some studies have used combinations of two or more of these 
methods to address selection bias, using cross-sectional or longitudinal data. Box 4.1 provides an overview 
of these methods. 
Box. 4.1. Techniques to addressing selection on unobserved student characteristics 
Empirical strategies using cross-sectional data 
 Randomisation: where oversubscribed government-dependent private schools are required to assign 
places to applicants using a lottery, they generate natural treatment and control groups, which are 
stochastically equivalent and only differ from each other with respect to the treatment (i.e. private school 
attendance). Peterson et al. (2005) made use of such voucher lotteries in three American cities and 
compare the recipients with those who had remained in public schools. This allows them to control for any 
unobserved differences between the two groups and to thereby isolate the effect of private school 
attendance. Yet, studying lottery systems limits the study population to students who have chosen to apply 
to selective schools to begin with. Inferences regarding the potential effect of private school attendance may 
therefore not extend to students who have not chosen to or failed to apply. 
 Instrumental variables: in the absence of randomised assignment, the use of instrumental variables can 
provide an alternative source of variation and a means to control for unobserved confounders. Valid 
instruments are correlated with the relevant independent variable without influencing the dependent variable 
by any other means. Since it is free of endogeneity, the instrumental variable’s association with the 
dependent variable (passing through the independent variable of interest) provides us with an unbiased 
causal estimator. This approach has been used in studies of Swedish and Chilean private schools 
(Sahlgren, 2011, Hsieh and Urquiola 2006) but is limited by the availability of strong and valid instruments. 
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Box. 4.1. Techniques to addressing selection on unobserved student characteristics (cont.) 
 Heckman's two-stage correction models: Heckman correction allows researchers to correct for selection 
bias by explicitly modelling the process of selection and, in a second step, controlling for the correlation 
between the residuals of the selection and the outcome variable. This approach relies on the strong 
assumption that the residuals that jointly influence selection and outcomes follow a specified distribution, 
and also requires the researchers to identify an instrumental variable to include in the selection equation 
(Heckman, 1979; Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004: 491). The Heckman strategy has been used, for 
example, by Mizala and Torche (2012), Sapelli and Vial (2002), and Elacqua (2011). The limitations of this 
method have been addressed by Lara et al. (2011), who reproduce Heckman correction models, 
demonstrating that the positive estimates of private school effects produced by these methods disappear 
once prior achievement is controlled for. 
 Matching: another strategy to address the problem of self-selection is to compare the treatment group with 
a synthetic control group that is matched on observable characteristics to resemble the individuals who 
received the treatment. Some studies have compared the achievement of private school students with that 
of public school students showing similar baseline test scores prior to enrolment (e.g. Oeterson and 
Chingos, 2008). More sophisticated studies match their control group with regards to multiple variables and 
avoid the problem of multidimensionality by reducing a vector of covariates into a single scalar representing 
the estimated propensity of attending a particular school type. Propensity score matching requires a large 
number of observations in order to ensure that the compared groups are sufficiently similar. Even then, the 
technique relies on the assumption that differences between treatment and control group are fully captured 
by the observed variables. In contrast to strategies relying on instrumental variables, matching is a 
non-parametric method which does not require the researcher to specify which form the relationship 
between the dependent and control variables takes. It therefore avoids the assumption that effects are 
uniform across the distribution of covariates (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004). As Vandenberghe and Robin 
demonstrate using PISA data from Austria, France and Ireland, the choice between parametric and 
non-parametric techniques can yield diverging estimates of the effect of private education (2004: 491f.). 
Propensity score matching has also been used by Dronkers and Avram (2009), Lara et al. (2011), and 
Krueger and Zhu (2004). 
Empirical strategies using longitudinal data 
 Regression discontinuity: regression discontinuity (RD) offers a quasi-experimental design for longitudinal 
studies in case students are assigned to a particular school type based on a clear threshold on a continuous 
variable, such as their residence or their score in an entrance exam. If there is some random variation in the 
assignment variable, the candidates just above and below the threshold can be used as a treatment and 
control group respectively. The use of RD techniques is based on the assumption that subjects cannot 
self-select into the treatment by actively manipulating whether or not they fall above or below the threshold 
(an example might be the practice of postponing entrance by one year). Furthermore, the external validity of 
estimated effects might be restricted to students around the margins of the cut-off, especially where the 
treatment effect is expected to be heterogeneous across the distribution of the assignment variable. 
RD methods have been used, for example, by Clark (2010) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014). 
 Student fixed effects: in the research on private schooling, fixed effects estimators allow to control for 
time-invariant student characteristics (both observed and unobserved) by restricting the analysis to multiple 
observations of individual students and their association with the dependent variable. For example, fixed 
effects models may estimate the effectiveness of school types by measuring the change in performance 
associated with a student moving from one provider to another. It is important to bear in mind that fixed 
effects estimates are based on an exclusive sub-sample of students who moved between school types. The 
validity of the estimates may therefore be subject to “mover bias” if students who switched schools 
systematically differ from those who did not. For example, changing schools can indicate a prior mismatch 
which may in turn be reflected in the student’s performance (Loveless and Field, 2009). Furthermore, 
switching schools is a disruptive event in itself, which can cause a student’s achievement to drop in the 
short-term as they adjust to the new environment (Lara et al., 2011: 134). Examples of studies using student 
fixed effects are Ballou et al. (2008) and Sass (2006). 
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Box. 4.1. Techniques to addressing selection on unobserved student characteristics (cont.) 
 Difference-in-differences analysis: a special case of fixed effects models, difference-in-difference 
analyses make use of observations before and after an intervention (such as a change to the school 
system) in order to compare the treatment and control groups’ change in the dependent variable. By 
focussing on changes, rather than absolute levels, the method controls for baseline differences in the two 
non-randomly selected groups. Assuming that the treatment and control groups would have followed the 
same trend had the intervention not taken place (“parallel trend assumption”), the method implicitly controls 
for unobserved variables affecting both the treatment and the control group during the period under study. 
Lara et al. (2011), for example, compares the performance of Chilean students who switched to private 
schools after their primary education with similar students remaining in the public school system and find a 
small positive effect of voucher school attendance. See Peterson and Chingos (2008) for another 
application of this method. 
4.1.3 Regression toward the mean in longitudinal studies 
In longitudinal studies, estimates of private school effects may also be biased upward if the choice of 
moving to a private school is caused by or systematically associated with a temporary drop in student-
performance due to factors that are unrelated to the type of school they attend. For example, a public 
school student might be assigned a particularly strict teacher, perform worse than in previous years, and 
decide to move to a charter school as a consequence. In this case, Sass (2006) suggests that “[i]f the 
student’s performance would have rebounded in the next year (even if they had stayed in a traditional 
public school), then the measured effect of charter schools will be biased upward” (Sass, 2006: 103). To 
address this type of bias, Sass (2006) estimates a probit model to rule out that switches from public to 
charter schools are determined by prior drops in student performance or other factors. 
4.1.4 Clustered student-data and violations of the conditional independence assumption 
Most studies of student achievement are based on data exhibiting a hierarchical or nested structure. 
That is, data in which individual observations are clustered in groups whose constituent members can be 
expected to have a certain similarity by virtue of belonging to the same group. In this case, students are 
nested in classrooms, which are in turn nested in schools. Both schools and classes may affect their 
students’ achievement in one way or another, which violates the assumption or ordinary regression 
techniques that observations on students in the same class or school are conditionally independent. 
Nevertheless, many studies comparing student performance across school types still employ ordinary 
regression techniques and disaggregate higher-level variables (such as school resources), treating them as 
individual-level student characteristics. This will result in underestimated standard errors for regression 
coefficients and lead researchers to overstate the statistical significance of effects related to classroom or 
school characteristics. 
Multilevel analysis is the natural method of choice to address these issues when dealing with nested 
data. It allows to control for both ecological and individual-level variables, identifying and taking into 
account the different variance at each distinct level of analysis. Bellei (2008), for example, uses a 
multilevel regression model to control for both individual and school characteristics that might affect the 
achievement of Year 10 students in Chile. Mizala and Torche (2012) use a two-level hierarchical linear 
model to investigate the relationship between add-on fees and student achievement in Chile, controlling for 
school and student characteristics. 
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4.2 Identifying the impact of school competition on student performance 
Studies examining the effect of public-private school competition on the quality of public schools or 
aggregate student achievement are vulnerable to endogeneity arising from the fact that the proportion of 
students attending private schools in any given area may be a result of the poor quality of public schools, 
rather than the other way around. Sandström and Bergström (2005), for example, find low average marks 
in Swedish school districts to be a strong predictor of independent schools entering the market. Some 
studies address this problem using instrumental variables, such as the proportion of Catholic residents in 
US school districts, which Dee (1998) hypothesised would increase the number of private schools 
independent of student achievement. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), on the other hand, suggest addressing the 
threat of endogeneity by controlling for pre-existing trends that are correlated with private sector growth. 
4.3 Estimating the cost and efficiency of different school types 
Comparing the efficiency of schools or school types requires the analysis of both their output and 
inputs, i.e. the extent to which they fulfil their objectives and the cost at which they do so. Data limitations 
and methodological challenges make the identification of either of these factors difficult in practice. This is 
one of the reasons for the dearth of empirical research comparing the efficiency of different school types or 
analysing the effect of private school funding on system-level efficiency.  
Unobserved school inputs 
Not all “inputs” commonly featured in educational production functions, such as teacher quality, 
school resources and student background, can be easily observed and measured, which makes it difficult to 
compare the economic cost of education across school types. This is particularly true since private schools 
tend to educate fewer students with special educational needs or low socio-economic status (see Figure 3), 
who tend to be more costly to educate. Furthermore, the value of vouchers and even the expenditure of 
private schools might give us an incomplete picture of their true costs since many (especially religious) 
private schools receive additional resources in the form of “special fees, church subsidies, teachers 
working at below-market wages and donations of money, time, land and buildings” (Ladd, 2002: 12).  
Heterogeneous input prices 
Empirical studies rarely have data on the prices providers need to pay for educational inputs and 
therefore fail to account for their heterogeneity across schools. This is particularly relevant to the study of 
private education since – unlike public schools – independent schools are not obliged to provide universal 
services regardless of factors like geographical remoteness and are therefore likely to open in locations 
with favourable circumstances. In their study of Chilean voucher schools in the 1990s, McEwan and 
Carnoy (2000) try to address this heterogeneity with the use of municipality dummies to control at least for 
“unobserved determinants of costs that are constant across the municipality, such as local market prices” 
(p. 220).  
Exogeneity of school inputs 
Contrary to the assumption of conventional education production functions, most schools cannot 
freely adjust the absolute or relative level of their inputs in order to minimise costs. Government 
regulations and contracts constrain schools in their ability to appoint and dismiss staff, decide on the 
allocation of budgets, or expand class sizes, while other inputs take a long time to adjust. The fact that 
public and private schools may differ with regards to the control they have over these inputs further 
complicates the matter: PISA 2012 shows that the average government-dependent private school has more 
autonomy over the allocation of resources than public schools across all OECD countries with available 
data (OECD, 2014: Table C7.5). As a consequence, to the extent that they are exogenously determined, 
EDU/WKP(2016)21 
 26 
educational inputs should be controlled for when assessing a school’s efficiency. In their analysis of school 
costs in Chile, McEwan and Carnoy (2000) treat school inputs as endogenous, while acknowledging the 
pitfalls of this research design (p. 220).  
Unobserved school outputs 
Most studies of educational efficiency measure school outputs on a single dimension, such as 
students’ scores in standardised tests. However, “[s]chools are complex institutions with multiple 
objectives, many of which are not captured by exam results alone” (Muir, 2012: 12). For example, private 
schools may give their students an advantage in college admissions or the labour market by offering 
special training or access to social networks (see McEwan and Carnoy, 2000). Unless such outputs are 
controlled for, estimates of the relative efficiency of private and public schools are likely to be biased. 
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5. THE REGULATION OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION AND ITS IMPACT ON EQUITY AND 
EFFICIENCY 
5.1 The prevalence of selective admission in OECD countries 
Of the 36 countries surveyed for Education at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators, 7 allow government-
dependent private schools to exercise selective admission based on academic criteria at the primary level, 
13 at the lower secondary level, and 15 at the upper secondary level. Of the countries with available data, 
16 do not permit their government-dependent private schools to select students based on academic criteria 
at the primary level, compared to 11 at the lower secondary level, and 8 at the upper secondary level 
(OECD, 2011, Table D5.13). In multiple countries, government-dependent private schools select their 
students based on academic criteria while public schools do not. As of 2011, this was the case in France 
across all levels of school education, in Switzerland at the primary and lower secondary levels, in Chile at 
the primary level, and in New Zealand at the lower secondary level (OECD, 2011, Table D5.13). 
5.2 Theoretical intuition 
While most OECD countries afford private schools some discretion over their curricula and other 
aspects of their operation, countries differ widely in the extent to which they regulate the admission 
practices of publicly funded private schools. 
In the Flemish Community of Belgium, for example, private schools are not permitted to select 
students on the basis of their academic achievement as a means to guarantee parents the right to free school 
choice. Some countries permit oversubscribed private schools to take into account non-academic factors in 
the admission process, including geographic proximity, the presence of siblings in the school, or the timing 
of applications. By contrast, countries such as (until 2015) Chile permit publicly funded private schools to 
select students based on academic criteria using prior marks, aptitude tests, or other methods such as 
parental interviews, which are likely to give households with higher educational attainment or  
socio-economic status an advantage. 
Effects of selective admission on student stratification 
Differential admission practices across school sectors can lead to student stratification along the lines 
of both academic achievement and socio-economic status and might explain some of the differences in the 
student composition of public and government-dependent private schools discussed above. If privately 
managed schools have more freedom to select their students than public schools, they might try to 
prioritise access for or exclusively select students of higher socio-economic status or ability both because 
they are less costly to educate and because parents might use a school’s student composition and 
achievement to judge its quality (Ladd, 2002: 13). This process of “cream skimming” threatens to deprive 
the public school system of high-ability students, which – in the presence of peer effects – is likely to 
disadvantage the students who remain in public schools. Since student performance is correlated with 
socio-economic advantage across the OECD and its partner countries and economies (OECD, 2010), cream 
skimming based on ability also means that “privately managed schools will tend to have more 
socio-economically advantaged students enrolled than publicly managed schools” – a phenomenon that can 
be observed in nearly all OECD countries (OECD, 2012a: 40). 
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Effect of selection on school competition and overall achievement 
Allowing schools to select students can alter the dynamics of inter-school competition, which might in 
turn affect the education system’s aggregate level of achievement. If private schools are allowed to use 
academic or socio-economic criteria in their admission process, they might – rather than trying to increase 
students’ learning outcomes by improving their teaching quality– simply compete by selecting students 
who are easier to teach. This strategy of cream skimming can not only undermine the intended benefits of 
school competition on quality, but also result in a concentration of disadvantaged students in public 
schools and deplete them of vital resources. Empirical evidence from Chile (Bellei, 2008), for example, 
appears to confirm that private schools used academic admission criteria as a means to compete with other 
schools on the basis of selectivity (potentially at the expense of quality). Selective admission practices 
have also been argued to negatively affect the effort and motivation of students. If students can signal their 
educational ability by gaining admission to a selective school, they have less of an incentive to work hard 
and advance their skills once they are enrolled (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009). 
Indirect selection and self-selection effects 
It should be noted that student sorting based on ability or socio-economic status can also occur in the 
absence of explicit admission criteria since socio-economic advantaged parents find it easier to 
successfully navigate the process of school choice and are more likely to take academic criteria into 
account when choosing a school (Hastings et al., 2005). Given these information asymmetries, the OECD 
has recommended “raising awareness, improving disadvantaged families’ access to information about 
schools and supporting them to make better-informed choices” (OECD, 2012b: 64). Even private schools’ 
discretion over their registration times can result in cream skimming since well-informed parents are more 
likely to register their children early and thereby obtain an advantage over parents who are not aware of 
these deadlines. Centrally determined admissions times across schools can serve as a means to prevent this 
(OECD, 2012b: 70). 
“Selective expulsion” of students 
Although school selectivity is most commonly observed at the point of admission, student selection 
may continue throughout the schooling process. Based on a 2002 survey for the Chilean Education Quality 
Measurement System (SIMCE) , the parents of 31% of students in Year 4 of subsidised private schools 
report that they expel retained students (compared to 14% of the parents in municipal schools) (Bellei, 
2008). As will be discussed further below, this implies that private voucher schools more commonly 
engage in the selection of students not only based on their predicted ability, but the academic capacity they 
demonstrate later on (Bellei, 2008: 176). If expelled students are likely to switch to public schools, this 
selective expulsion could contribute to cream skimming at the level of individual schools and the private 
sector more widely. 
5.3 Formal models and simulations 
In formal models and simulations incorporating peer group or reputation effects, schools have an 
incentive to select their students based on ability. Although this is rarely taken into account in the 
computational literature, this effect could also occur if students’ ability was assumed to be inversely related 
to the cost of their educating. Modelling the interaction between free, open public schools and 
fee-charging, selective private schools, Epple and Romano (1998) suggest that the ability to select students 
would incentivise profit-oriented private schools to cream skim high-ability students from the public sector 
to improve their average student ability and attract high-income students with the prospect of positive peer 
effects. 
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Allowing schools in a competitive education system to select their students may not only increase 
stratification but also lower aggregate achievement. Using a sophisticated model that accounts for the 
importance of school reputation, MacLeod and Urquiola (2009) simulate the effect of selective admission 
in conjunction with school voucher schemes. In a labour market where employers have imperfect 
information on applicants’ skills, it is assumed that students have an incentive to signal their ability by 
attending a school with a good reputation (i.e. with high average student skills). To improve their success 
in the labour market, students therefore face a choice between improving their own skills by exerting more 
effort, attending a school with a high teaching quality, or attending a school with a high student quality and 
reputation, regardless of its value added. 
While the entry of for-profit private schools in a non-selective system might create efficient 
competition if the schools’ only way of attracting students is by providing them a high-quality education, 
allowing them to select students based on ability could have severe negative consequences for equity and 
achievement, based on MacLeod and Urquiola’s model. Since selectivity allows schools to increase their 
reputation and attractiveness even without improving their value added, the model predicts the emergence 
of a “strict hierarchy of schools, with the highest ability students going to the most selective for-profit 
schools, and the low ability ones remaining in the non-selective public sector” (MacLeod and Urquiola, 
2009: 5). This stratification across schools increases the significance of school reputation relative to 
students’ test scores as a skill-signalling strategy in the labour market. As a consequence, students might be 
less inclined to exert effort at school, which could lead to a reduction of aggregate student achievement. 
Furthermore, the ability stratification of schools means that students with lower ability would be even less 
successful in the labour market compared to a non-selective system where school reputation would be a 
less reliable proxy for student ability. 
The introduction of vouchers covering tuition fees would, according to this model, exacerbate the 
positive features of non-selective systems and the negative features of selective systems respectively. 
Under an open enrolment regime, vouchers would increase the likelihood of poor students attending 
non-selective fee-paying schools with a high value added. In a selective system, all students with higher 
ability than the average public school student would take advantage of the voucher to attend selective 
schools with students of higher ability, leading to a gradual diminishment of the non-selective sector and 
the stratification of schools across the entire system. MacLeod and Urquiola’s simulation does not take into 
account the correlation between income and ability, but in the absence of vouchers or restrictions on add-
on fees, student-selection would most likely lead to stratification by income as much as by ability. 
Other models have simulated the likely effects of restricting student-selection. Using a two-phase 
simulation of school choice that separately considers the application and the enrolment, Chakrabathi 
(2013) predicts that “random private school selection alone cannot obviate sorting by income” at the 
application stage, unless it is accompanied by the absence of add-on tuition fees (Chakrabathi, 2013: 215). 
Even in the absence of selective admission, however, Chakrabathi’s model predicts that sorting by ability 
will be “considerably difficult to prevent” (ibid.), if the parental preference for educational quality is 
assumed to increase with their “household ability”, thus leading highly-educated households to more 
readily accept the opportunity costs of applying for higher-quality private schools. 
5.4 Countries’ approaches to selective admission in publicly funded private schools 
In Chile, which has been operating an extensive voucher programme since the early 1980s, publicly 
funded private schools used to extensively engage in selective admission. Although Epple, Romano and 
Urquiola (2015: 14) report that educational legislation had repeatedly spoken out against selection 
practices in private schools, schools were not required to operate admission lotteries and empirical 
evidence documented the wide-spread use of selection practices. A survey of 726 Chilean parents found 
that the majority of private schools made use of parental interviews or admission tests to select their 
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students (Gauri, 1998). In a more recent survey carried out as part of SIMCE, 44% of Year 4 parents 
reported that their voucher school selected students based on admission exams, and 36% reported the use 
of parental interviews (SIMCE, 2006). 
With the introduction of targeted vouchers under the 2008 Preferential School Subsidy Act (Ley de 
Subvención Escolar Preferencial, SEP), schools in Chile that admitted students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds (around 40% of the student population in participating schools) were given substantial extra 
funding. In addition, the government introduced a smaller subsidy for schools with a high proportion of 
poor students, the Grant for the Concentration of Priority Students (Subvención por Concentración de 
Alumnos Prioritarios). To receive any of the targeted funds, public and private voucher schools had to 
agree not to charge eligible students any fees and not to select their students based on ability or socio-
economic background. Nearly all public schools and around 66% of government-dependent private schools 
took part in this voluntary scheme (OECD, 2013c: 8). The Inclusion Law (Ley de Inclusion) introduced 
in 2016 went even further, prohibiting all private voucher schools to practice selective admission based on 
parental interviews, prior academic achievement, or characteristics such as their marital status. Only some 
schools with special academic status (e.g. “emblematic” schools) or requiring early specialisation 
(e.g. vocational schools) are partially exempt from these rules. The consequences of these new regulations 
are not yet apparent and all empirical studies considered for this review were conducted at a time when 
subsidised private schools in Chile made extensive use of selective admission. 
Under the Swedish voucher system, “independent” private schools receiving public funding must be 
approved by the School Inspectorate, are not allowed to charge add-on tuition fees and must not engage in 
selective admission based on ability or family background at the primary and lower secondary levels. 
Instead, oversubscribed independent schools determine students’ priority based on the time of application, 
their proximity to the school and enrolled siblings. Although schools may be religious or focus on a 
particular ethnic group or language, they must be open to all students (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015: 
17). 
In the Netherlands, more than two thirds of 15-year-olds attend publicly funded private schools. 
Most of these are religious, including Protestant and Catholic schools, which enrol about 27% and 29% of 
the student population, respectively. Although publicly funded private schools are not allowed to charge 
mandatory add-on tuition fees or operate for profit, state-funded schools can supplement their funding with 
voluntary contributions from parents or businesses and private schools receive significantly more of them 
than the public ones do (OECD, 2014b: 16). Publicly funded private schools are not allowed to engage in 
selective admission but parents of prospective students may be required to subscribe to the school’s profile 
or principles (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015: 16). Public and private schools receive the same amount 
of public funding in the form of a lump sum allocation based on the number of enrolled students. Since the 
mid-1980s, additional subsidies were assigned for disadvantaged students to reflect the higher cost of 
teaching them (OECD, 2014b: 16). Since 2006, these voucher weights have been based on parental 
educational attainment, replacing previous criteria based on students’ immigration background (Ladd, Fisk 
and Ruijs, 2011).  
Spain makes use of a “controlled choice” system which allows parents to freely choose among 
schools but includes mechanisms to ensure that disadvantaged students are not crowded out of popular 
schools. Oversubscribed schools therefore take into account factors such as low family income and 
disabilities alongside previously enrolled siblings and the proximity of the parents’ home or workplace. In 
addition, regional education authorities can prescribe quotas to ensure a balanced distribution of students. 
Nevertheless, since the students’ residence plays an important role in the admission process and some 
schools charge complementary fees or deviate from the prescribed admission process, publicly subsidised 
private schools have been observed to enrol a disproportionately small number of disadvantaged students 
(OECD, 2012b: 69). 
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The Flemish Community (Belgium) operates a system of extensive school choice, funding both 
public and private schools based on the number of students they enrol. Private schools are not allowed to 
charge add-on tuition fees but were permitted to use selective admission criteria until enrolment procedures 
were regulated by the 2002 Decree on Equal Educational Opportunities and its subsequent revisions 
(Musset, 2012). Oversubscribed schools are now only permitted to use a limited set of selection criteria 
such as the presence of siblings at the school and – in the case of primary schools – the school’s position 
on the parents’ list of preferences and its distance to the parents’ residence or workplace (Cantillon, 2013). 
5.5 Empirical evidence on the effect of selective admission 
5.5.1 Effect on student stratification and school performance  
Effect of selective admission on student stratification  
Selective admission procedures have been suggested as a possible cause for the stratification of 
students across schools and school sectors. In a comparison of school choice programmes in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Santiago, Chile, Alves et al. (2015) find both the use of school choice as well as 
the quality of schools chosen to be more strongly associated with students’ socio-economic status in Chile 
than in Brazil. One explanation for this difference, according to the authors, is the fact that Chilean schools 
were permitted to restrict access by imposing add-on tuition fees and employing selective admission 
procedures. Yet, empirically isolating the effect of selective admission on stratification from 
country-specific contexts and other barriers to entry is difficult in cross-national research designs.  
McEwan (2001) uses the local density of educational providers across Chilean municipalities as an 
instrumental variable for students’ likelihood to attend government-dependent private schools. Controlling 
for self-selection in this way, the author finds that students with higher socio-economic status, higher 
income and more educated parents are significantly more likely to attend mostly selective private schools. 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) investigate the effect of selectivity on student segregation from 1982 
to 1996 in Chile. During this period, publicly funded private schools were not allowed to charge add-on 
tuition fees (ibid.: 1480), which might have otherwise confounded the relationship between selective 
admission and segregation. Employing a difference-in-differences design to exploit variation in the 
opening of new private schools across municipalities, the authors find the expansion of the selective 
private sector to be associated with a “middle-class flight into private schools” (p. 1499). The relationship 
between private school entry and the exodus of high-ability students from public schools is robust to the 
use of instrumental variables for private school growth, which could be endogenously caused by 
pre-existing trends in municipalities’ school performance. 
Studies of selective admission in other contexts have yielded similar results. For example, Bygren 
(2016) finds that academic selection criteria have significantly increased achievement sorting among 
Swedish public schools. The longitudinal study makes use of a quasi-natural experiment, which occurred 
in 2000 when the municipality of Stockholm introduced academic admission criteria for oversubscribed 
upper-secondary schools, while prohibiting add-on tuition fees. 
Academic selection criteria can increase student stratification not only along the lines of ability and 
achievement, but also along other dimensions such as socio-economic status, immigration history, or 
ethnicity. This can be due to the statistical correlation between these different dimensions of stratification, 
or due to schools’ implicit or explicit selection on these characteristics. In Chile, early small-scale survey 
studies suggested that a students’ socio-economic background played an important role in getting admitted 
to selective private schools, net of their academic ability (see also Bellei, 2008). In the case of Stockholm, 
Söderström and Uusitalo (2010) find that the introduction of academically selective admission has led to 
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ethnic segregation beyond the level that would have been expected based on the increase in 
socio-economic and ability sorting, while Bygren (2016) finds no evidence of segregation on other 
dimensions than ability. 
Arguably, different selection criteria should be expected to cause different forms of student sorting 
and it is therefore important to take into account country-specific regulations when comparing patterns of 
segregation across educational systems. While upper-secondary students in Stockholm, for example, were 
selected based on their high-school marks, parents in Chile report that many schools employed criteria that 
were explicitly based on socio-economic status, like parental interviews or the provision of income 
certificates (Contreras et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, as discussed before, it should be noted that expanding school choice through private 
school funding might be associated with increased levels of segregation, even in the absence of selective 
admission criteria. The experience of school choice among non-selective public and private schools in 
Sweden (to be distinguished from the admission system in Stockholm) might be instructive here. Regions 
with more independent voucher schools have experienced higher levels of school segregation based on 
parental education and between immigrants and natives, controlling for residential segregation (Böhlmark 
et al., 2016), although some studies find this “white flight” phenomenon to be confined to Metropolitan 
areas (Yang Hansen and Gustaffson, 2016). Empirical studies on Sweden tend to agree, though, that 
residential segregation has had a greater impact on the rise in school segregation than school choice alone 
(Lindbom, 2010; Böhlmark et al., 2016; Lindbom and Almgren, 2007). In contrast to the experience of 
Chile, the evidence from Sweden might therefore suggest that non-selective admission among publicly 
funded private schools can ameliorate at least some of the segregation that comes with school choice 
policies. 
Effects of selective admission on aggregate and school-level achievement 
Schools that select their students based on ability tend to attain higher test scores than those practicing 
open admission (Gauri, 1998). Selectivity can increase a school’s performance both directly, by raising the 
average ability of their student population, and indirectly through the peer effects that may accrue to 
students by virtue of being surrounded by high-ability classmates (see Section 5.5 below). Furthermore, 
sorting students based on their ability might make it easier for schools to cater to their students’ 
educational needs by gearing their provision to students of a particular ability level. On the other hand, if 
the marginal benefit of high-ability peers is larger at the lower than the upper end of the ability distribution, 
the aggregate effects of student sorting on performance may be negative. 
Empirically identifying these effects requires researchers to isolate the effect of ability-based selection 
from the educational benefits that selective schools might impart on students regardless of their selection 
practices. In addition, research designs need to address the problem of reverse causality since schools 
might be able to choose among a large number of applicants because they are known for providing a high 
academic quality. Conversely, schools might also be able to choose talented students because they are in 
high demand for features unrelated to their academic performance (e.g. location or special amenities) 
(Contreras et al., 2010). 
In general, empirical evidence suggests that selective schools do not always provide students with a 
higher-quality education and that allowing for selective admission could indeed lead to a situation in 
which, “rather than striving to increase their students’ learning outcomes, private schools might simply 
compete by trying to attract children who are easier to teach” (Brandt, 2010: 18). In order to avoid cream 
skimming from the public sector and provide schools with incentives to compete on the basis of quality 
rather than selectivity, Brandt (2010: 20) highlighted the importance of ensuring “equal conditions to 
compete for schools, including regarding selective procedures” across sectors. 
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As discussed above, some studies of Chilean voucher schools have suggested that their higher 
performance is mainly a result of their selectivity, rather than the quality of their provision. Early analyses 
by Gauri (1998) suggested that “creaming accounts for at least a proportion of the variation in achievement 
levels among subsidized schools” (1998: 72). Using more sophisticated multivariate regression, Contreras 
et al. (2010) arrive at the same conclusion and find that selection criteria considerably contribute to the 
performance gap between public and private schools in Chile, controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics at the school and individual levels. However, the estimates of ordinary regression methods 
are likely to confound the relative effectiveness of selective schools with unobserved characteristics of 
their students. As a consequence, such research designs cannot distinguish the net effect of attending a 
selective school from factors such as motivation or ability which may have played a role in the admission 
process.  
Some studies have used more sophisticated techniques to isolate the effect of attending a selective 
school from unobserved characteristics, such as innate ability or educational ambition, on the basis of 
which students may have been selected or self-selected into these schools. Clark (2010), for example, uses 
a regression discontinuity design to test the effect of attending selective public grammar schools in  
the United Kingdom. The author exploits the “sharp change in the possibility of attending selective school 
over a narrow range of assignment test scores” to identify the effect of grammar school attendance by 
following the achievement trajectories of students who fell narrowly on either side of the cut-off point. The 
attendance of selective schools was found to only have a small effect on standardised test scores and 
positive peer effects were subtler than implied by previous studies using linear-in-means specifications of 
educational production functions. 
Using a similar regression discontinuity design, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) find that the attendance 
of heavily oversubscribed exam schools in Boston and New York was not associated with a significant 
improvement in exam scores or the colleges students moved on to attend. In the absence of higher 
educational quality or strong peer effects, the high demand for selective schools, suggests that parents 
mistakenly equate high-ability peers with educational quality, or that they value selective schools for 
reasons other than their educational quality. According to the authors, either of the two would “reduce the 
likelihood that school choice in and of itself has strong salutary demand-side effects in education 
production” (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014: 179).  
These regression discontinuity designs might be limited in their external validity since they only 
measure the treatment effect on students at a particular level of ability and one should be careful in 
extrapolating their results to other student groups. Nevertheless, their design allows for relatively robust 
causal inferences. Although not all regression-discontinuity studies come to the same empirical 
conclusions (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola [2013] find that admission to selective schools in Romania 
improved cognitive skills and students’ effort while reducing that of their parents) it is clear that selective 
schools do not always provide the students they target with a higher quality education than non-selective 
schools. 
Particularly where private schools do not provide a higher value added than public schools, students 
may be attracted to selective schools for a number of reasons: First, since passing the selective admission 
procedure provides a signal of their ability in the labour market, second, since a school’s student 
composition is often assumed to proxy for its quality and finally, due to the promise of positive peer 
effects. Schools, in turn, have an incentive to compete on the basis of selectivity to signal higher quality to 
parents and the labour market, and to attract students that are less costly to educate. Allowing schools to 
select students may therefore provide perverse incentives that can undermine the positive effects 
competition may otherwise have on school quality (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009). 
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In some cases, student selection also occurs beyond the point of admission in the form of selective 
expulsion. At least up to 2005, private voucher schools in Chile have not only exercised selective 
admission more often than public schools, but have also more frequently expelled year repeaters. 
Controlling for student and school characteristics, Bellei (2008) has demonstrated this practice to be 
associated with a 0.19 standard deviation increase in test scores. It may therefore constitute another means 
for private schools to engage in cream skimming and undermine potential restrictions on selective 
admission.  
5.5.2 Student stratification and peer effects 
 Increased student stratification is considered one of the major consequences of selective admission 
among publicly funded private schools. Since its consequences on both individual and aggregate learning 
outcomes largely depend on peer effects, the following section provides a brief discussion of the way in 
which individuals’ performance is affected by that of their classmates. From a theoretical point of view, the 
aggregate effect of ability sorting on educational achievement is ambiguous since it depends on the way in 
which these peer effects accrue to students at different points on the ability distribution. Empirical studies 
of ability grouping usually find changes to the peer composition to have little or no effect on system-wide 
performance but to widen the achievement differentials between students of high and low ability, thus 
contributing to educational inequity (see Hattie [2009] for meta-analyses of empirical studies). 
Furthermore, Bygren (2016) finds the long- and short-term effects of ability sorting on student 
achievement-gaps to vary considerably across social groups. Future research will be needed to identify and 
find means to effectively address the potential inequities arising from these differential effects. 
Peer effects, student sorting and school choice 
Many arguments, both for and against policies to increase school choice, are based on assumptions 
about the nature of peer effects and their consequences for educational outcomes and equity. In the context 
of school education, the existence of peer effects suggests that students’ educational achievement and 
aspiration are not only a function of their own, but also their peers’ characteristics. 
Opponents of school choice cite peer effects as a reason why school choice might disadvantage 
low-achieving students if their higher-performing peers leave for better schools (Hanushek et al., 2003: 
527). Others suggest this increased ability sorting could also reduce aggregate achievement if high-ability 
students benefit from the exposure to talented peers less than low-ability students or if the variance in peer 
achievement has a positive effect on educational outcomes in and of itself. Proponents of school choice, on 
the other hand, argue that increased sorting can improve global performance if peer effects are such that 
high-achievers benefit more from high-ability peers than low-achievers do. 
Evaluating the strength and prevalence of peer effects also has important implications for other 
educational policies. For example, improving individual students’ performance through targeted 
programmes or tutoring could – in the presence of positive peer effects – generate positive externalities by 
raising their peers’ performance as well (Hanushek et al., 2003: 542). 
Theoretical intuition of peer effects 
Peer effects can operate at the level of schools or classrooms and affect different educational outputs 
including students’ educational achievement, their school choices and their educational aspirations. There 
are multiple theoretical hypotheses regarding the direction and relative strength of peer effects for different 
student groups. 
Most studies assume that peer effects cause students to assimilate each other, particularly with respect 
to their achievement (Hoxby, 2000b; Hanushek et al., 2003). A number of mechanisms related to social 
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interaction and identification have been hypothesised to drive these effects, including normative pressures 
to conform with one’s social environment, students helping one another out, peers affecting the classroom 
atmosphere and students bringing resources from their home to the classroom (Hoxby, 2000b: 28). Much 
empirical research has assumed this effect to be linear while others have relaxed this assumption and 
allowed it to vary across the achievement distribution: 
1. Linear models assume that “a student’s own achievement is affected linearly by the mean 
achievement of his peers” (Hoxby, 2000b: 28). According to this model, the mean student 
achievement is expected to remain constant regardless of how students are distributed across the 
school system since weak students suffer from ability segregation to the same extent that good 
students benefit from it. 
2. Non-linear models allow for peer effects to vary across the achievement distribution. In general, 
non-linear models can support arguments both for and against increased student sorting, 
depending on the relative strength of peer effects across the student distribution. If, for example, 
high-ability students benefit more from being surrounded by strong peers than low-ability 
students, increased student sorting would be expected to raise the aggregate performance. 
Another example of non-linear peer effects would be performance gains caused by a high or low 
variance in peer achievement. In this case, all students could equally gain or suffer from an 
increase in student segregation (Hoxby, 2000b, pp. 2f.). 
Other theories suggest that peer effects could also work in the opposite direction and exacerbate 
differences through mechanisms of social contrast. Being exposed to and comparing themselves with peers 
of high ability can lead students to develop a lower estimation of their own capacity. A lower sense of 
self-worth and academic ability might reasonably be expected to depress a student’s achievement and 
lower their educational aspirations. Nevertheless, this strand of the theory has received considerably less 
attention in the recent literature (for an exception, see Jonsson and Mood, 2008). 
Methodological challenges 
The greatest challenge in identifying peer effects is to circumvent selection bias. Much of the 
variation in students’ peer ability is generated by selection on the part of schools or parents. Parental 
school choice is influenced by their level of education, their income, workplace, or residence, which are 
correlated with their child’s ability while selective admission procedures may explicitly sort students based 
on their ability. In some schools, students are then further allocated to classes and programmes based on 
their interests, past achievement, or other characteristics. As a result, a student’s position in a particular 
school and classroom is subject to a host of unobserved characteristics which may affect their achievement 
and are not controlled for in ordinary least squares regressions. Some studies have addressed this problem 
by exploiting endogenous variation in students’ classroom composition using instrumental variables 
(e.g. Hoxby, 2000b). Another way to address selection bias is to make use of natural experiments in which 
students are randomly allocated to their peers (for example, Sacerdote, 2001 studies peer effects among 
freshmen at Dartmouth College who were randomly assigned a roommate). In any case, controlling for the 
effects of peer achievement remains difficult, not least given the theoretical ambiguity surrounding the 
functional form they should take. 
Empirical evidence on peer effects 
Studies employing more sophisticated statistical techniques to identify the effect of peer group 
influence have yielded a positive relationship between students’ achievement and that of their peers. 
Hoxby (2000b) identifies positive peer effects in Texas public schools by exploiting idiosyncratic variation 
in adjacent cohorts’ peer group composition along the lines of gender and ethnicity (assuming that parents 
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and schools cannot perfectly predict or manage a cohort’s ability composition). The findings suggest that a 
1 point increase in the average test score of their peers increases a student’s test scores by an estimated 
0.10 to 0.55 points. Hanushek et al. (2003) also find evidence of positive peer effects using student and 
school-by-mark fixed effects to control for unobserved variables. In their estimation, the exposure to peers 
who score 0.1 standard deviation higher increases students’ test scores by 0.02 standard deviations, while 
tests for the presence of non-linear peer effects and the benefits of high variance in peer achievement 
yielded no systematic evidence. 
Although the aggregate effect of student sorting on educational outcomes is usually estimated to be 
low or insignificant (see Hanushek et al. [2003] for Texas and Bygren [2016] for Sweden), most studies 
using achievement as the dependent variable have found that students in high-ability contexts benefit from 
positive peer effects while those in low-achievement contexts suffer. In this context, increased student 
sorting, although it might not alter overall achievement, is likely to exacerbate existing inequities related to 
educational stratification and increase the association of school outcomes and socio-economic background. 
Although experimental studies based on random assignment in Kenya have found student sorting to benefit 
all students (possibly by allowing teachers to focus their attention and resources on low-achieving 
students), the authors caution that these findings might not apply in developed countries with a narrower 
ability distribution and different teacher incentives (Duflo et al., 2011: 1770).  
Whether and how peer effects vary across different dimensions of social stratification is contested. 
Some studies find peer effects to be more pronounced among students of lower socio-economic status or 
ability (Levin, 2001a; Zimmer and Toma, 2000). However, well-designed studies of non-linearity and 
asymmetrical peer effects remain small in number and most of them are inconclusive, finding no or only 
partial evidence for asymmetries based on students’ achievement or socio-economic status (see Ladd 2002: 
13f.). While Hanushek et al. (2003) find peer effects to be linear across Texas public schools and therefore 
do not expect redistribution or sorting to affect the aggregate level of achievement, Hoxby (2000b) 
statistically rejects the assumption of linearity but finds no generalisable support for any particular 
non-linear specification of peer effects either. Her results rather suggest that peer effects may operate in a 
more complex interaction with peers’ gender and ethnic composition as well as their achievement. 
Evidence on the influence of peer groups on outcomes such as educational choices or aspirations 
remains scarce but suggests that the peer effects operating in these contexts might be quite different from 
those affecting achievement. Making use of a natural experiment to control for selection bias, Sacerdote 
(2001) finds positive peer effects among randomly assigned college roommates for academic achievement, 
but no significant effects on their choice of academic subjects. Jonsson and Mood (2008), using a model 
with school level fixed-effects and controlling for students’ social characteristics, identify peer effects in 
Swedish comprehensive schools, indicating small but significant negative peer effects on students’ 
aspirations when choosing upper secondary schools. This suggests that the exposure to more successful 
peers may diminish students’ educational self-image or confidence. 
5.6 Limitations and future research 
Despite important advances in the empirical analysis of student selection among publicly funded 
private schools, important questions remain to be addressed. Empirical evidence on the use of different 
selection criteria (e.g. parental interviews versus test scores) and their respective effects on stratification 
along social dimensions other than ability is still disparate or inconclusive. Likewise, determining the 
relative impact of selection in contexts where private schools also charge add-on tuition fees remains a 
challenge for future research. We are also only beginning to understand the impact of stratification on 
equity, efficiency and learning outcomes. Most research on peer effects and the consequences of student 
sorting has focussed on their effect on academic achievement. Particularly in the longer term, though, 
students’ attainment also critically depends on their educational choices and aspirations. Furthermore, 
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countervailing mechanisms of social contrast have received little attention in previous research and few 
studies have convincingly investigated how peer effects operate at different levels of achievement and how 
they might differ across students with different socio-economic characteristics. The relative dearth of 
empirical research on these outcomes means that we do not yet have a complete picture of the complex 
mechanisms of social influence contributing to the effects of school choice and increased student sorting. 
5.7 Conclusion: Selective admission 
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that publicly funded private schools use admission policies to 
select students of higher ability and socio-economic status, where they are allowed to do so. This increases 
the ability stratification of students across the education system and gives private schools a means to cream 
skim high-achieving students from the public sector. Depending on the criteria used in selection processes, 
school selectivity may also increase stratification along other socio-economic dimensions. 
There is little evidence that student sorting could improve aggregate student performance but it can be 
expected to widen the gap between low-achieving and high-achieving students and schools due to peer 
effects. Since selective private schools do not generally appear to provide students with a higher value 
added than non-selective or public schools, the relative expansion of the selective school sector is also 
unlikely to raise aggregate achievement based on compositional effects. 
Allowing private schools to select their students also provides them with incentives that might 
undermine the positive effects that school competition may otherwise have on educational quality. 
Consistent with theoretical models accounting for school reputation, providers that are allowed to select 
their students are likely to compete on the basis of exclusiveness, rather than quality. Extending public 
funding to selective private schools is therefore not only likely to exacerbate student stratification; it may 
also interfere with other policy objectives of school choice programmes. 
The literature on school choice strongly suggests student selection occurs not only at the point of 
admission, but also through parental self-selection throughout the application process and selective 
expulsion. Education systems differ in the extent to which they regulate these points of selection, for 
example, by standardising application deadlines or restricting the expulsion of retained students. Both 
policy-makers and future research should therefore pay close attention to sources of student selection both 
before and after the point of admission. 
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6. THE REGULATION OF ADD-ON TUITION FEES AND ITS IMPACT ON EQUITY AND 
EFFICIENCY 
6.1 The prevalence of add-on tuition fees in OECD countries 
Across OECD countries, government-dependent private schools demand financial contributions from 
parents in 15 education systems at the primary level, 15 at the lower secondary level and 14 at the upper 
secondary level. By contrast, parents sending their children to government-dependent private schools do 
not have to pay fees in 7 school systems at the primary level, and in 9 systems at the lower and upper 
secondary levels. Tuition fees are much less common among public schools, with only 2 school systems 
demanding such contributions at the primary and lower secondary levels and 3 at the upper secondary level 
(OECD, 2011, Table D5.17). 
6.2 Theoretical intuition 
In most countries, government-dependent private schools are not allowed to charge any tuition fees, 
or – in voucher systems – no fees exceeding the sum of the parental vouchers. Restricting add-on tuition 
fees serves multiple purposes. On the one hand, it is meant to guarantee that private schools use public 
funds to substitute parental contributions, i.e. to widen access to students from financially disadvantaged 
backgrounds and prevent higher-income students from sorting into separate schools (Epple and Romano, 
2012). 
On the other hand, restricting private schools’ ability to charge tuition fees prevents them from 
obtaining a competitive advantage over free public schools. In the absence of such regulations, Jacobs 
(1980) predicted that public subsidies might stimulate private schools to raise their fees above the sum of 
the voucher and top-up the funding with parental contributions. Such additional resources might be used to 
attract and further deplete public schools of high-ability or high-income students, which could widen the 
socio-economic and achievement gaps between public and private schools. 
Since students of high socio-economic status tend to be less expensive to educate, private schools 
have an incentive to use tuition fees as a means to restrict access to disadvantaged students. Given the 
correlation of socio-economic status and ability, charging add-on tuition fees can also be a means to cream 
skim high-achieving students from the public sector without explicitly selecting them based on academic 
criteria. The practice of charging add-on tuition fees can therefore be considered an indirect selection 
mechanism (OECD, 2012a: 64) and considered within the wider context of a school system’s policies on 
selective admission procedures. As Epple, Romano and Urquiola argue, “requiring a school to admit all 
voucher applicants but letting it discriminate in tuition can render the former restriction moot” (2015: 22). 
Countries that allow publicly funded private schools to charge tuition fees may or may not permit 
them to discriminate in the amount they charge individual students. Schools might, for example, offer 
tuition fee deductions, fee waivers, or scholarships to attract high-ability students from low-income 
households. Depending on these aspects of policy design, add-on tuition fees may give rise to different 
patterns of segregation, which will be further discussed below. 
In some cases, publicly funded private schools do not receive the same amount of financial resources 
as public schools and are expected to supplement them with tuition fees or other contributions. In 
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Lithuania, for example, private schools are entitled to the same amount of central government funding as 
public schools to cover their teaching costs, which tend to be the budget’s largest component. However, 
they are expected to raise their own funds for school maintenance expenses including maintenance staff, 
student transportation and repair works (Shewbridge et al., 2016: 96). Charging tuition fees that are not 
fully covered by vouchers always constitutes a potential entry barrier for low-income students and may 
restrict parental choice. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish fees that merely cover a specific type of 
expenditure not included in the public subsidy from those that far exceed the gap between public and 
private school funding. 
Partial funding and add-on tuition fees  
In some countries, government-dependent private schools do not receive the same level of 
government funding as public schools. In some of these systems, private schools are allowed to charge 
tuition fees in order to make up for this difference between public and private financial resources. The 
practice of “topping up” may here be seen as a legitimate means to level the playing field between private 
and public schools. In multiple US states, such as Minnesota, for example, private school attendance were 
subsidised with tax credits or tax deductions without imposing restrictions on tuition fees. Similarly, in 
Denmark only about 70% to 80% of the average municipal school funding follows student when switching 
to the private sector. Private schools charge parents an annual tuition fee intended to roughly put them on 
equal financial footing with the municipal schools.  
While this arrangement results in an equal level of funding between public and private schools 
without giving either side a competitive advantage, it may still prevent low-income students from making 
full use of school choice. Furthermore, in the absence of any upper limit, private schools in such 
mixed-funding systems may charge parents considerably more than would be necessary to cover the 
funding gap between the private and public sector. 
Partial public funding, paired with a high tuition price elasticity of demand, may also fail to provide 
sufficient incentives for private schools to enter the market or expand. Huerta and d’Entremont, for 
example, cast doubt on the effectiveness of Minnesota’s partial tax deduction programme in stimulating 
supply. Reviewing enrolment levels between 1975 and 2005, they conclude that it “has not increased the 
demand for private schooling in Minnesota, nor has it prompted a substantial increase in private school 
capacity” (2007: 95). 
6.3 Formal models and simulations 
Effect of add-on tuition fees 
Theoretical hypotheses concerning the effect of tuition fees have been complemented with formal 
econometric models, simulating their impact based on a set of assumptions about the behaviour of students 
and schools under in a given educational and regulatory environment. 
Epple and Romano (1998) model a school system with free, non-selective public schools and selective 
private schools charging add-on tuition fees and price-discriminating between individual students. Under 
these conditions, introducing flat-rate vouchers of a certain size yields a considerable growth in the private 
school sector and significant cream skimming. Private voucher schools would be expected to draw both 
high-income and high-ability students from public schools since they could let well-off students pay higher 
tuition fees to cross-subsidise students with high ability in return for positive peer effects. If each student 
was charged their reservation price, tuition would be higher for students with low ability while highly able 
students might even face negative effective marginal cost. Public schools – drained of their best students – 
would experience a loss in educational quality due to negative peer effects. Like many simulations 
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focussing on the distributional consequences and peer effects of vouchers or add-on tuition fees, Epple and 
Romano’s (1998) model does not take into account the improvements in technical efficiency that voucher 
proponents claim to result from competition. Since school quality is assumed to only be a function of 
student inputs, evaluating claims regarding different schools’ efficiency or effectiveness remain open to 
empirical investigation. 
In a similar model simulating the interaction between selective, price-discriminating private schools 
and free, non-selective public schools, Epple and Romano (2008) allow for the schools’ quality to vary 
with both the ability of their student body and the schools’ expenditure. While private schools adjust their 
expenditure so as to maximise profit, the quality of public schools is assumed to be homogenous. Students 
are assumed to differ in their ability and income along a continuous distribution while their academic 
achievement is a function of their ability and school quality. Calibrated to US data from 1999, the model 
predicts that flat vouchers under these laissez-faire conditions would create a hierarchy of private schools, 
stratified by quality as well as their students’ income and ability. The public sector would lose students of 
both high ability and high income. If the amount of the voucher is high enough to cover the minimal fixed 
and variable costs of education, the model also expects the entry of bottom-feeder private schools offering 
a lower quality of education than the public schools and attracting poor students with monetary kickbacks, 
rebating some of the voucher amount. 
Although the model’s assumptions may not hold in practice (particularly concerning the permissibility 
of kickbacks in the form of negative fees), it highlights the difficulty of implementing vouchers while 
allowing schools to select their students and charge fees. Even if selection were banned, the model shows 
that schools would have an incentive to undermine the restrictions, thus requiring significant efforts to 
ensure compliance, unless the amount of the voucher closely reflects each student’s effective marginal cost 
of education. 
It should also be noted that both models by Epple and Romano (1998, 2008) assume schools to be 
profit-maximising. Yet, the authors suggest that the models would predict add-on tuition fees to have a 
similar effect if schools were to pursue a different objective, such as quality- maximisation as opposed to 
profit-maximisation (Epple and Romano, 2008: 1399). The simulations therefore nevertheless provide an 
insight into the effects of add-on tuition fees on school behaviour under different school choice regimes. 
Nechyba (1999) adds another layer of complexity by taking into account the role of residential 
mobility in the effect of voucher programmes. The model assumes homogenous public schools with open 
enrolment and selective private schools charging add-on tuition fees. Other than in Epple and Romano 
(1998, 2008), schools are not allowed to discriminate in their tuition policy and therefore charge all 
students the same price. The model assumes households to differ in income and simultaneously choose 
whether to send their children to a private or public school, which neighbourhood to reside in (taking into 
account the quality of housing and schools) and whether to vote for a property tax to be added to the 
district’s public school funding. A school’s perceived quality is a function of its socio-economic 
composition and expenditure per student. Calibrating the model to New Jersey data, Nechyba’s simulation 
predicts that the provision of vouchers would cause public schools to experience a drop in peer-quality as 
higher-income students would relocate to better quality public schools in other districts. At the same time, 
private schools are expected to open in poorer neighbourhoods, catering to high-income households that 
emigrated from other districts. The result is a declining peer quality in the public education system, 
although some of it may be offset by a reduction in residential stratification and the fiscal benefits this 
brings to locally funded public schools in poorer neighbourhoods. 
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Effect of indirect costs associated with school choice 
Chakrabarti (2013) presents one of the few models simulating private school behaviour and student 
sorting in a system where private schools are not allowed to select students or charge add-on tuition fees. 
Eliminating tuition fees, the author suggests, can be reasonably expected to reduce student sorting at the 
application stage, but additional means-tested subsidies would need to be in place to also prevent sorting at 
the point of enrolment. The model identifies two distinct mechanisms that might cause student sorting even 
under a regime of free and non-selective private schools. Based on the assumption that high-ability 
students value education more and are therefore more likely to bear the opportunity costs of applying, the 
model predicts ability-sorting at the application stage. At the enrolment stage, even in the absence of 
tuition fees, additional costs associated with school attendance may be disclosed (e.g. for transportation 
and extracurricular activities), causing student sorting based on income unless the voucher takes these 
additional costs into account. Under these conditions, the authors show that – in a system of non-selective 
admission – a “full payment of tuition by vouchers can preclude sorting by income in the application stage 
and perhaps also in the enrolment stage, if subsidiary monetary costs in the enrolment stage are also paid 
for by the voucher or the policymaker” (Chakrabarti, 2013: 215). The ability-based sorting at the 
application stage, however, is harder to prevent since it is the result of parental self-selection. The model’s 
observable implications are congruent with evidence from the 1990 Milwaukee voucher programme. Using 
a logit model and student-level data for the first five years of the voucher programme, the author confirms 
ability sorting at the application stage and income sorting at the enrolment stage. 
6.4 Countries’ approaches to add-on tuition fees in publicly funded private schools 
In Australia, government-dependent private schools (both Catholic and independent) are allowed to 
charge tuition fees (Watson and Ryan, 2010: 87). With the implementation of the Australian Education Act 
in 2014, a new funding system was introduced, providing all schools with recurrent per-student funding 
based on a needs-based Schooling Resource Standard (SRS) benchmark. Additional targeted funds are 
available for small and rural schools as well as schools teaching disadvantaged students (OECD, 2015c: 
195). Private schools receive between 20% and 90% of the funding public schools receive, depending on 
their school communities’ “capacity to contribute”, which is assessed based on parents’ socio-economic 
status, the level of parental contributions and other private sources of income. Private schools serving 
remote areas or student populations with special resource needs are exempt from this rule.  
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, introduced in 1990, provided eligible private school 
students with the lesser of the district’s average cost per public school student and the private school’s 
tuition fees.
6
 Initially, private schools were not allowed to charge fees exceeding the voucher amount. 
However, starting in 2011, schools could demand add-on fees from households with an income exceeding 
220% of the poverty line. The cost of transportation within a defined catchment area is covered by the 
district (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2015: 9). 
Denmark has a long tradition of publicly funded independent schools and a large and growing private 
sector, enrolling 23% of 15-year-olds in 2009 (OECD, 2013a). Since 1992, the amount of funding per 
students that private schools receive depends on their size and the students’ age distribution. All private 
schools are required to charge parents at least a small tuition fee of about EUR 500 per year as a means to 
ensure that parents have a financial stake and therefore maintain a high level of involvement in their 
chosen private school. Publicly funded private schools are allowed to charge additional tuition fees 
exceeding this baseline contribution (for which low-income households may receive waivers). To ensure 
that private and public schools enjoy similar levels of funding, the public grant for operational 
                                                     
6
 The income threshold for eligibility initially stood as 175% of the federal poverty level, but has been raised to 300% 
over the years. 
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expenditures amounts to about 70%-80% of the public schools’ funding. Total parental contributions vary 
between schools, averaging about DKK 1 000-2 000 per month (ca. EUR 130-260) (Houlberg et al., 2016: 
58f.). While public schools must accept all students, Danish private schools are also allowed to practice 
selective admission (Andersen, 2008), although not all of them make use of this right. 
Since 1994, elementary and secondary private voucher schools and municipal secondary schools in 
Chile have been allowed to charge limited tuition fees. Under the system of shared financing 
(financiamiento compartido), schools could charge additional fees of up to 1.6 times the public expenditure 
per student. Even though fee-charging schools received fewer public subsidies, these reductions only 
applied if the fees exceeded 50% of the public voucher and only lowered the voucher amount by a fraction 
of the schools’ additional income. Schools were required to spend up to 10% of their income from fees to 
finance scholarships though (OECD, 2012a: 53). In 1996, private contributions (including tuition 
payments, “Parent Center” fees, and the cost of uniforms and textbooks) accounted for 59% of the funding 
in non-religious voucher schools and around 38% in the ostensibly free public schools run by the 
Departmento de Administración de la Educación Municipal (DAEM) (McEwan and Carnoy, 2000: 223). 
However, since the introduction of the Inclusion Law in 2016, all private schools are required to phase out 
their tuition fees and other obligatory parental contributions (e.g. for school material) over the coming 
years in order to continue receiving public funding. The consequences of these new regulations are not yet 
apparent and all empirical studies considered for this review draw on Chile for examples of subsidised 
private schools charging add-on tuition fees. 
Independent schools in Sweden receive the same amount of funding as public schools and have been 
prohibited from charging additional fees since 1997. Prior to this, Swedish independent schools only 
received 85% of the average cost per student in public schools and were allowed to make up for this 
discrepancy by charging a small fee. 
6.5 Empirical evidence on the effect of add-on tuition fees 
Tuition fees and student segregation 
Tuition fees, much like selective admission, have been argued to restrict access to schools and 
exacerbate socio-economic stratification. Although tuition fees are well-documented to deter school 
attendance among low-income students in developing countries (Alderman et al. 2001; Deininger, 2003; 
Al-Samarrai and Zaman, 2007), evidence from OECD countries is comparatively scarce. Comparing 
enrolment patterns across different school types in Chile, Elacqua (2012) finds fee-charging private 
voucher schools to serve less than half as many students of indigenous descent or low socio-economic 
status as free private schools (14.2% compared to 37.0% in 2006). Whether or not schools charge add-on 
tuition fees emerges as the most important characteristic in explaining varying levels of socio-economic 
segregation across private voucher school sectors (ibid.: 450). According to the author, this suggests that 
“tuition-charging private voucher schools select student populations based on ability to pay” and that 
policies providing schools with incentives to charge tuition “even if it is only limited, can have a negative 
impact on school segregation” (ibid.: 450).  
Yet, the study’s descriptive design makes it impossible to ascribe causality to the observed association 
of tuition fees and student segregation with any certainty. Neither does the study control for factors such as 
the schools’ geographic location, which might affect their student population due to residential segregation 
regardless of financial barriers to entry. The same goes for academic selection criteria, which can 
contribute to socio-economic segregation due to the correlation between household income and academic 
achievement. Nevertheless, the study does show that the “adjusted voucher law” of 2008 – which increased 
the voucher size for disadvantaged students by 50% and prohibited schools from charging eligible students 
fees – was associated with a slight decrease in student segregation across all sectors (Elacqua, 2012). 
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Similar issues of causal attribution are found in the case of Denmark where students attending private 
schools tend to be of higher socio-economic background (Tornhøj Christensen and Ladenburg, 2012, cited 
in Houlberg et al., 2016), yet the extent to which this is caused by tuition fees, selective admission, 
self-selection or other factors is difficult to determine, not least given the great heterogeneity of private 
school providers and their respective student intakes. 
Alves et al. (2015) investigate the effect of voucher design in a comparative study of school choice 
programmes in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Santiago, Chile. Controlling for student ability and the 
availability of high-quality schools, students of higher socio-economic status were significantly more likely 
to make use of school choice by attending a school outside of their district. Even among the students who 
made use of vouchers, these patterns of stratification persisted, since well-off students were more likely to 
attend high-quality private schools. Notably, these socio-economic differences were more strongly 
pronounced in Chile than in Brazil – a phenomenon which the authors suggest could be explained by the 
fact that Chilean voucher schools were allowed to practice selective admission and charge add-on tuition 
fees. It is not clear, however, which of the policies had a greater impact on student segregation and whether 
additional factors, such as the greater diversity of Chilean school providers, might have contributed to the 
differences between the two countries. 
To more rigorously identify how add-on tuition fees impact student sorting and achievement, 
researchers have moved beyond cross-sectional research designs, not only investigating the introduction of 
tuition fees, but also their abolition in contemporary and historical contexts. Riphahn (2012), for example, 
exploits temporal variation in the abolition of public schools fees over a period of 15 years across 
16 German federal states. Based on individual-level census data from 1989, 1993 and 1997, she tests the 
impact of fee abolition on educational attainment across cohorts and states. The study addresses the threat 
of self-selection into treatment, excluding families who recently moved to states that abolished fees, and 
plausibly rejects the alternative hypothesis that changes in student attainment led to an abolition of fees, 
rather than the other way around. The study concludes that abolishing fees increased upper secondary 
school attainment by an average of at least 8% and that women’s demand for education was more sensitive 
to fees than men’s (possibly a consequence of their lower marginal returns to education in the labour 
market). Although differences in the price elasticity of educational demand would have been expected to 
deter low-income students from taking advantage of educational opportunities, Riphahn’s study shows that 
add-on fees also have the potential to exacerbate gender inequalities. 
The equity-improvements resulting from a ban on add-on tuition fees were also investigated by 
Neilson (2013), who shows that restricting add-on tuition fees for disadvantaged students in Chile and 
increasing their voucher significantly raised their test scores. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, the 
author compares the change in student achievement among the poorest 40% of students with the rest of the 
student population, following the introduction of targeted vouchers in 2008. The targeted voucher 
programme prohibited the participating schools from charging the poorest 40% of students tuition fees and 
mandated them to refrain from selective admission. Compared to the rest of the student population, those 
who benefited from the voucher are estimated to have improved their academic outcomes by 0.2 standard 
deviations, thereby narrowing their achievement gap by one third (Neilson, 2013: 45). 
The mechanism by which this improvement came about is not straight-forward. Other than might be 
assumed, the effect was not a result of low-income students relocating to better, previously unaffordable 
schools. Rather, as predicted by Neilson’s (2013) theoretical model, schools serving low-income students 
appear to have improved their quality (possibly because the targeted voucher increased their resources and 
incentivised them to compete for low-income students). It is thus not clear whether banning add-on tuition 
fees without simultaneously raising the voucher amount for low-income students would have improved 
their outcomes to the same extent. 
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The effect of public funding in the context of add-on tuition fees 
Providing vouchers for the attendance of fee-charging private schools has been suggested as a means 
to open them up to students who could not otherwise afford them. For this strategy to be successful, the 
public funding would need to cover all or a substantial proportion of the tuition fees, which is usually 
achieved by prohibiting eligible schools from charging fees that exceed the sum of the voucher. In the 
absence of such regulations, schools could either use the public subsidies to reduce their barriers to entry 
while maintaining a given level of quality, or to keep their tuition fees at a given level while investing the 
public funding to increase their quality. 
In 1974, Australia started providing low-income families with school vouchers without restricting 
private schools’ ability to charge add-on fees, which provides an opportunity to empirically investigate the 
effect of subsidies in the absence of tuition fee regulations. Watson and Ryan (2010) examine the effect of 
the reform using historical administrative and participation data from three cohorts (1975, 1995 and 2006). 
Their findings confirm that private schools used public subsidies to increase their perceived quality 
(operationalised as the student-teacher ratio), rather than to reduce their tuition fees. Since barriers to entry 
remained high, the voucher programme hardly altered the socio-economic composition of private schools. 
Even though vouchers were restricted to lower-income families, students of higher socio-economic status 
continued to be much more likely to make use of school choice. As a consequence, the programme led to a 
decrease in the average socio-economic status of public school students. Although the study can only point 
to temporal correlations, it strongly suggests that the voucher reform failed to improve equity since it did 
not restrict add-on tuition fees, leading the authors to conclude that “[s]trong government regulation in 
respect of tuition fees and an independent mechanism governing the selection of students who receive 
government subsidies would be the minimum regulatory requirement for any funding system aiming to 
expand educational opportunities through supporting private school choice” (Watson and Ryan, 2010: 
105). 
The problem of elastic tuition prices was already raised by Jacobs (1980), who suggested that 
substantial public funding for private schools would “offer a significant opportunity for schools to raise 
tuitions and thereby prevent a lowering in actual costs to parents” (Jacobs, 1980: 243f.). Long (2004) finds 
empirical support for this hypothesis in the context of higher education and demonstrates that tuition 
vouchers introduced with the 1993 Georgia HOPE Scholarships prompted both public and private 
four-year colleges to increase their student charges at a faster rate than similar institutions in nearby states. 
While public colleges raised room and board prices, private ones increased their tuition fees and reduced 
financial aid, recouping up to 30% of the scholarship and increasing the financial burden for students who 
did not qualify. 
There is some evidence that private schools in Chile used add-on tuition fees to cream skim students 
of higher socio-economic status without investing the additional resources to raise their educational 
quality. Analysing SIMCE data from 2002, prior to the introduction of targeted vouchers, Mizala and 
Torche (2012) find “virtually no association between parental add-on fees and test scores after the 
school-level socio-economic status is accounted for” (Mizala and Torche, 2012: 133).7 The study uses a 
multilevel regression model to account for students’ clustering within schools and a two-step Heckman 
model to control for non-random self-selection into private schools, using the municipality’s supply of 
different school types as an instrument. These findings substantiate concerns that uncapped tuition fees in a 
flat voucher system may serve as means for schools to select students based on socio-economic status, 
                                                     
7
 A study using SIMCE data from 2005, controlling for school, individual, and household characteristics, found a 
positive relationship between parental fees and student achievement (net of students’ socio-economic 
background) which disappears when controlling for selective admission criteria (Contreras et al., 2010: 
1362). 
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which “contributes to the inequality in test scores without improving the overall level of educational 
achievement” (Mizala and Torche, 2012: 142). 
6.6 Limitations and future research 
Due to both endemic data limitations and the small number of cases, most studies of add-on tuition 
fees have distinguished between schools that charge fees and those that do not, rather than comparing the 
effect of different levels of tuition fees. As a consequence, we have limited knowledge regarding the point 
at which parental contributions begin to deter families from lower socio-economic background in 
high-income countries from attending publicly funded private schools. 
As is the case with regulations on selective admission, the success of policies restricting add-on 
tuition fees depends on the development and implementation of monitoring and compliance mechanisms. 
Unless private schools are effectively held to account and prevented from subverting accreditation and 
funding requirements, restricting their eligibility for public financing is unlikely to yield the desired results. 
The cost of operating compliance systems should therefore receive careful attention when considering the 
efficiency and potential financial gains from publicly funding private providers, even though it has – as of 
yet – received little attention in the debate on school choice. 
6.7 Conclusion: Add-on tuition fees 
Allowing publicly funded private schools to charge add-on tuition fees exceeding the amount of the 
voucher can limit the extent to which disadvantaged students make use of school choice programmes. This 
may be reflected in the underrepresentation of low-income students among fee-charging private schools, 
but studies that convincingly test the causality of this relationship are rare – not least due to the scarcity of 
empirical examples. Nevertheless, studies of historical cases and the more recent targeted voucher reform 
in Chile suggest that targeted vouchers and fee abolition are an effective means to reduce the achievement 
gap between students of higher and lower socio-economic status, while also highlighting the inequities that 
pertained under a system permitting add-on tuition fees. 
Existing research also points at ways in which add-on tuition fees can undermine the policy objectives 
of school choice programmes. As predicted by theoretical simulations, allowing schools to charge add-on 
tuition fees means that public subsidies are unlikely to widen access to private schools. Rather, voucher 
schools have been shown to use public funding to increase their quality which threatens to widen existing 
achievement gaps between students who can afford them and those who cannot. If regulations permit 
private voucher schools to run for profit, schools may retain part of the public subsidies and use fees to 
compete based on selectivity without increasing their educational quality. This is what the research 
suggests was the case in Australia and Chile respectively. 
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7. THE REGULATION OF FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS AND ITS IMPACT ON EQUITY AND 
EFFICIENCY 
7.1 The prevalence of for-profit schools in OECD countries 
Few OECD countries allow publicly funded private schools to operate for profit. Notable exceptions 
over the past decades have included Chile, where for-profit schools were eligible for public subsidies until 
the introduction of a new Inclusion Law in 2016, Columbia (from 1992 to 1996), Estonia, New Zealand, 
Sweden (since 1992) and a number of US states that allow for-profit organisations to operate charter 
schools. A detailed description of the respective policies is provided in Section 7.4. Of these countries, 
only Chile and Sweden had a substantial commercial school sector and have therefore been studied the 
most extensively, alongside smaller US charter school programmes, e.g. in Florida and Michigan.  
7.2 Theoretical intuition 
Most countries that publicly fund private education prohibit subsidised schools from operating for 
profit. Under these conditions, for-profit education providers are placed at a disadvantage compared to 
public schools or non-profit private schools and face a high barrier to entry. Even if non-profit private 
institutions are not publicly subsidised, they are likely to be more successful at raising donations or 
employing personnel at below-market prices than for-profit providers. As Levin argues, in a market where 
“even the most expensive private schools with the most elite clientele fail to cover their costs with tuition”, 
trying to do so while making a profit constitutes a formidable challenge (Levin, 2001b: 6).  
In order to facilitate the entry of for-profit private schools, some have therefore advanced the idea of 
publicly subsidising commercial providers on the same terms as their non-profit counterparts. Subsidising 
for-profit schools has been argued to invigorate competition, increase the diversity of providers and attract 
private capital to finance the creation of new school buildings, particularly in school systems facing a 
shortage of school places. A 2011 World Bank report suggests that extending financial support to for-profit 
schools is a necessary step to progress towards a “mature” competitive environment that “[r]eflects 
international best practice, or full engagement with the private sector” (Lewis and Patrinos, 2011, Figure 9: 
29). Rather than restricting public funding to non-profit schools, market entry and exit could be determined 
by “high levels of accountability” and whether or not for-profit providers are “delivering high-quality 
outcomes for the students that they serve” (Lewis and Patrinos, 2011: 7). Others have urged governments 
to restrict public funding to non-profit institutions or “give priority in access to publicly funded school 
improvement programs and other public resources (texts, computers, teaching materials, teacher 
training, etc.) to schools serving the public good” (Bellei, 2008: 190). The remainder of this section will 
lay out some of the theoretical arguments for and against the public funding of for-profit schools before 
reviewing and discussing the relevant empirical evidence. 
Publicly funding for-profit schools is commonly objected to on the basis that their motives might not 
align with the public good. Other things being equal, for-profit schools can be expected to spend fewer 
resources on their educational provision than non-profit schools since part of their revenue is retained in 
the form of profit. This retained revenue, which could have otherwise been used to improve or expand their 
educational offer, constitutes a deadweight loss, which might discourage policy makers from publicly 
funding for-profit schools. In practice, this inherent inefficiency of for-profit providers might be 
outweighed by the quality of their educational provision or their effect on school competition. Much of the 
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discussion on the permissibility of publicly funded for-profit schools is therefore based on the question 
how they would behave in a competitive environment and how their provision might differ from that of 
non-profit schools. Another concern frequently raised regarding for-profit providers is the risk of financial 
corruption (Baum et al., 2014) and the difficulty of effectively monitoring their use of public resources. 
Given the small number of countries that provide public funding for private for-profit school, many 
contributions to the literature have been of a theoretical or computational nature, yet the following 
discussion will draw on relevant empirical evidence whenever possible. 
Competitive behaviour of for-profit schools 
Proponents of subsidising for-profit schools argue that competitive pressures would force commercial 
providers to offer high-quality educational services, consistent with the general argument for school choice 
(see Section 3). If for-profit schools fail to compete with other subsidised schools by offering lower 
attendance costs, they would be expected to do so based on their superior performance or by appealing to 
the preferences of a particular clientele. Some also argue that the strong financial incentive to attract 
students could lead for-profit schools to develop innovative management structures and educational 
techniques or be particularly responsive to the needs of parents and students. Proponents of for-profit 
schools expect their presence to lead to improvements in other school sectors too – either by intensifying 
competition or by encouraging public and non-profit schools to adopt successful practices emanating from 
the for-profits sector. 
Besides the inherent deadweight loss involved in financing for-profit schools, the main concern of 
their opponents is that commercial providers might prioritise driving down costs over their students’ 
educational outcomes in order to maximise profit. Even though they would be subject to competitive 
pressure, for-profit schools might not compete on the basis of educational quality alone but rather seek to 
distinguish themselves based on non-educational amenities or marketing campaigns. Intensified 
inter-school competition in the absence of appropriate regulations might thereby cause a diversion of 
resources away from the provision of educational services. Especially among for-profit schools seeking to 
establish a strong brand identity, critics have warned that “marketing and promotion inevitably will absorb 
resources that could have gone to instruction” (Levin, 2001b: 11). 
 The competitive behaviour of for-profit private schools is expected to be shaped by their regulatory 
environment. For example, provided that schools are allowed to practice selective admission, for-profit 
schools might try to increase their perceived effectiveness or value added by cream skimming students of 
high ability or those with the greatest expected performance gains (possibly students in the lower-middle of 
the ability distribution) from the public and non-profit sector (Levin, 2001b: 10). Another factor which is 
likely to influence the behaviour of for-profit schools, is the time-horizon with respect to which they seek 
to maximise their gains: while some may try to develop high-quality schools aimed at long-term 
profitability, others might focus on short-term profits and turn out to provide a lower quality (Böhlmark 
and Lindahl, 2015: 536). 
Teaching and employment practices 
If schools are evaluated in standardised tests and compete on the basis of student performance, for-
profit schools with more flexible managerial and personnel policies might try to attract and retain teachers 
based on their performance. If commercial providers are allowed to diverge from national salary or staffing 
regulations, they might offer performance-related bonuses (or punish low-performers), speed up teachers’ 
career progression, and offer training programmes or other benefits to attract the most able teachers. By 
contrast, since wages tend to account for 80% or more of an average school budget, Levin (2001b) 
anticipated commercial schools to reduce their personnel costs by hiring less experienced teachers with 
lower salaries, employing part-time staff, increasing class sizes, or reducing the length of the school day. In 
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the case of the United States, Levin suggests that “[w]here the laws have granted them flexibility, for-profit 
schools have tended to hire their teachers with less concern for whether they have met certification 
requirements. In some states they need not meet conventional certification requirements at all” (Levin, 
2001b: 8). 
Experience from for-profit Education Management Organization (EMOs) in the United States seems 
to confirm that for-profit schools tend to introduce stronger incentive structures (implying a higher 
performance pressure) but also more extensive development opportunities for teachers than public schools. 
Some for-profits, such as Edison Schools “emphasize strong professional development by providing as 
much as three weeks of training a year for teaching staff. By contrast, public schools typically provide only 
three to four days of staff development a year, with little follow-up or assessment of results" (Levin, 
2001b: 8f.). Levin also (2001) reports that for-profit EMO schools often employ teachers on fixed term 
contracts and renew them based on performance evaluations. Other strategies to retain valued teachers in 
for-profit schools include the provision of rewards for substantive specialisation and more extensive career 
ladders than public schools can offer.  
The extent to which for-profit schools can compete and distinguish themselves based on teaching and 
employment practices depends not only on a country’s regulatory framework but also the relative size of 
the for-profit sector. A report by Laird and Wilson (2012), for instance, notes that it “is difficult to deviate 
from national pay and staffing norms when only a minority of schools have such freedoms” and that they 
might not be able to make use of them “until there is a critical mass of independent state schools” (Laird 
and Wilson, 2012: 17). 
Innovative educational practices 
Proponents of subsidising for-profit education argue that the entry of private sector providers would 
foster educational innovation. These claims are difficult to test robustly, yet anecdotal evidence suggests 
that US for-profit schools distinguish themselves from non-profit institutions mainly through their 
personnel practices, professional development and management style, rather than innovative instructional 
practices (Levin, 2001b). In other contexts, the innovations fostered by market-based reforms have been 
observed to be primarily concerned with marketing, rather than teaching (Lubienski, 2009: 23). According 
to Lubienski, this phenomenon “points to the inherent tension facing schools with the freedom to innovate, 
but the requirement to be accountable for results as judged on a uni-dimensional standard of academic 
achievement and consumer approval”, which may lead for-profit operations to privilege the minimisation 
of costs over the risk of experimentation (Lubienski, 2009: 40). In some cases, for-profit providers may 
also face more specific institutional constraints impeding their capacity to innovate. As Levin reports, 
principals of US for-profit schools are equipped with more decision-making power in the realm of 
personnel practices than their non-profit counterparts, but not necessarily with respect to instruction, which 
tends to follow centrally determined corporate guidelines, particularly if for-profit franchises seek to 
develop a “brand identity” across multiple sites (Levin, 2001b: 9). 
7.3 Formal models and simulations  
Objective functions of for-profit and non-profit schools 
Given the relative scarcity of for-profit providers among OECD countries, a number of formal 
econometric models have been proposed to test theoretical hypotheses regarding their effect, based on a 
series of assumptions about the behaviour of students and schools under a given set of regulatory 
constraints. In fact, the majority of models simulating the effect of school choice are based on the 
simplifying assumption that all schools maximise profit (see Epple and Romano, 1998, 2008; Neilson, 
2013; Tapia, 2010). Apart from the fact that publicly funded for-profit providers are absent from most 
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school systems, this raises the question how to characterise the behaviour and incentives of non-profit 
providers in comparison. 
In some models’ simulated equilibria, schools pursuing non-profit objectives such as maximising 
student achievement or satisfaction have been shown to behave in a similar way as for-profit schools since 
neither would provide students with more than their equilibrium reservation utility (Epple and Romano, 
1998: 38). If certain assumptions hold, competitive pressures could thus lead profit maximising schools to 
provide a similar standard as quality maximising ones (Epple and Romano, 2008: 1399). Exploring the 
differences between for-profit and non-profit schools under less restrictive assumptions would be an 
important extension to this literature. 
Computational models 
In a computational model calibrated to features of Chile’s education market, Tapia (2010) simulates 
the behaviour for-profit and non-profit schools under a universal flat-voucher system that allows schools to 
select students but prohibits add-on tuition fees. Students are assumed to differ in ability and income while 
schools differ in productivity, investment decisions and their objective functions. Education outcomes are 
considered a function of student ability and school quality, which in turn is a function of the school’s 
productivity and its level of investment. In this scenario, Tapia argues, allowing for-profit schools to enter 
the market would not decrease the system’s productive efficiency or students’ achievement. The model 
assumes that non-profit schools exhaust their entire budget, aiming to maximise their students’ outcomes, 
while for-profit schools will only invest enough of their budget to prevent the marginal school from 
entering the market. Despite the fact that for-profit schools, by definition, do not exhaust their budget and 
reinvest the full voucher amount, their survival in the market should imply that there are no non-profit 
schools which could provide a higher level of productivity even though they would make use of the entire 
voucher (Tapia, 2010: 51). Since the model is based on a one-to-one matching design, pairing each school 
with only one student, it precludes the analysis of peer effects as well as incentives to expand and attract 
more students, which might affect the simulation’s results. 
A simulation by Epple and Romano (1998) suggests that the introduction of universal vouchers in a 
system with for-profit private schools charging add-on tuition fees and practicing selective admission 
would have concerning consequences for equity. The authors assume public schools to be free, of 
homogenous quality and open to all students, while private schools are assumed to be equally effective, to 
maximise profit, and to set their admission and tuition policies to select students based on their income and 
ability. Private schools can price-discriminate between students by offering tuition discounts to high-ability 
students with low income. In a competitive equilibrium, the model predicts a considerable redistribution of 
students towards the private sector, leaving low-ability and low-income students behind in public schools, 
which would experience a loss in educational quality due to negative peer effects. In the private sector, 
schools are expected to be segregated by student ability and income. Up to a certain voucher amount, the 
funding of private schools is expected to have a positive effect on aggregate student achievement and the 
cost of education. Any voucher amount above this size (calculated to range from USD 0 to USD 4 200) is 
expected to negatively affect aggregate outcomes. However, the vouchers’ positive effect on aggregate 
achievement relies on the strong assumption that high-ability students would gain more from an improved 
peer quality than low-ability students would suffer from a reduction in theirs. The authors acknowledge 
that there is very little evidence to support this assumption and the opposite scenario, in which increased 
segregation would not only harm public school students but also reduce aggregate student achievement, 
seems equally plausible. 
In a counter-factual simulation, Neilson (2013) compares the predictions of a computational model 
with the observed effects of the Chilean voucher reform. The model relaxes the assumption of perfectly 
competitive markets and adds complexity by accounting for geographical variation in household incomes 
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and the supply-side response to policy initiatives. Private schools are assumed to endogenously set their 
educational quality (e.g. by using better teachers and material or by exerting more effort) and charge 
tuition fees to maximise profit. Student achievement is not subject to peer effects and schools are spread 
across neighbourhoods with varying levels of income. Households differ by income, residence, educational 
preferences, as well as their sensitivity to the price of education and the distance of schools. Under these 
conditions, Neilson’s model predicts that profit-maximising schools funded by a flat voucher and permitted 
to charge add-on tuition fees would provide lower-quality education in poor neighbourhood and thereby 
exacerbate social and geographical inequities. 
By treating the quality of schools as an endogenous variable, Neilson’s model shows that profit-
maximising schools could take advantage of the fact that lower-income families are more price sensitive 
and less willing to travel, which gives schools more local market power and allows them to mark down 
their quality further below the perfect competition level in poor neighbourhoods (Neilson, 2013: 45). This 
echoes concerns regarding both the equity and quality implications of subsidising for-profit schools. 
Means-tested vouchers are shown to ameliorate some of these problems. Under the model’s assumptions, 
providing low-income families with additional funding would reduce their price sensitivity and allow them 
to be more sensitive to the quality of education. This intensifies the competition between schools in 
low-income neighbourhoods by diminishing their market power and forces them to improve their quality. 
The observable implications of Neilson’s theoretical model are consistent with empirical evidence from 
Chile, suggesting that the positive effects of targeted vouchers might in part be explained by a reduction in 
the market power of for-profit providers in poor neighbourhoods. 
Although the results yielded by these computational models should be considered in the light of their 
assumptions, they highlight some of the potential consequences of funding for-profit schools. If 
commercial providers are forced to operate under the same conditions as public schools, their remaining in 
the market would confirm that they are as effective as their competitors despite their failure to fully 
reinvest their revenue to improve their provision. Yet, allowing for-profit schools to charge add-on tuition 
fees is likely to exacerbate the stratification of the school system and lead to cream skimming from the 
public sector. The models also highlight the risk that for-profit schools might exploit regional variations in 
students’ price sensitivity if they possess a significant market share, which can reinforce existing economic 
and geographical inequities. Of course, theoretical models of this kind are based on simplifying 
assumptions about, for example, the way in which students and parents choose between schools and the 
quality of information they can base their decision on. Furthermore, simulations necessarily focus on a 
narrow set of educational outcomes and dimensions of equity. Although they provide powerful tools to 
generate and test our intuitions regarding the funding of for-profit education, empirical analyses are 
indispensable to evaluate its effects in practice. 
7.4 Countries’ approaches to funding for-profit private schools 
Until recently, private for-profit voucher schools constituted a substantial part of the school system in 
Chile. For-profit voucher schools tended to be relatively small in size and accounted for 27% of primary 
schools, serving 29% of primary school students in 2006, compared to non-profit voucher schools, which 
accounted for 9% of schools and enrolled 15% of the student population (Elacqua, 2012: 448). The number 
of for-profit schools rapidly increased following the 1981 voucher reform, which matched the public 
funding for private schools with that for public schools. Other than non-profit private schools, which are 
predominantly Catholic, for-profit schools tend to be non-denominational. Many of them were set up by 
former public school teachers and intended to serve the local community with only about 20% of them 
belonging to a school network (Elacqua, 2012: 447). Like other subsidised private schools in Chile, for 
profit voucher schools could practice selective admission and charge add-on tuition fees (Mizala and 
Torche, 2012: 134). In 2015, the government put an end to the public funding of for-profit private schools 
when passing the Inclusion Law, which will be gradually implemented over the coming years. The new 
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law also requires voucher schools to phase out obligatory tuition fees and stop selecting students based on 
parental interviews or prior academic achievement. The consequences of these new regulations are not yet 
apparent and the empirical studies considered for this review draw on Chile as an example of a school 
system with an extensive, publicly funded for-profit sector. 
In 1992, Sweden implemented a voucher system under which every school – private or public – is 
entitled to public funding. Private schools are entitled to receive subsidies of equivalent size to the local 
municipality’s average spending per public school student. The government imposes no restrictions on the 
ownership structure of accredited government-dependent private schools, allowing them to be operated by 
religious organisations, non-profit co-operatives, or for-profit corporations. The reform has led to a sharp 
increase in the share of independent schools, from about 1% to 10% of student enrolment at the primary 
and lower secondary levels and more than 20% at the upper secondary level in 2010. 65% of all 
independent schools are operated for profit, accounting for 13% of all schools (Sahlgren, 2011: 28). 
Publicly funded private schools must be approved and regularly evaluated by the Schools Inspectorate, and 
need to follow the national curriculum. Furthermore, they are not allowed to charge tuition fees or to select 
students in compulsory education based their ability (OECD, 2015b: 93, 159). 
In Estonia, 49 out of 544 general education schools are privately managed, while the other schools 
are predominantly provided by municipalities and to a lesser extent by the state. Private schools in Estonia 
are entitled to the same amount of public funding as municipal schools. The national government therefore 
allocates the same per-student grant for teacher salaries to private general schools as it does to 
municipalities. In addition, local governments provide them with funding for operating expenses such as 
school lunch, textbooks and study aids (Santiago et al., 2016; Eurydice, 2016). Private schools in Estonia 
are allowed to operate for profit and top-up the public funding by charging tuition fees, which parents can 
deduct from their taxable income. Furthermore, private schools’ teacher councils can introduce criteria for 
the selective admission of students (Eurydice, 2016). 
7.5 Empirical evidence on the funding of for-profit private schools 
7.5.1 Performance of for-profit providers 
For-profit charter schools in the United States 
Several US states permit publicly funded charter schools to be operated by for-profit providers, which 
has motivated a number of studies comparing the performance of students under different ownership 
models. Comparing for-profit and non-profit charter schools in Florida, Sass (2006) finds no difference in 
their respective effectiveness. Students attending recently established charter schools (less than five years 
old) regardless of their non-profit or for-profit status performed worse in mathematics and reading than 
comparable students in public schools. If the charter school was more than five years old, students 
performed as well in mathematics and better in reading than those attending public schools, which might 
indicate that charter schools improve as they gain more experience. The study convincingly addresses 
selection bias with a student fixed-effects model, drawing on the effect of school switches and thereby 
controlling for unobserved, time-invariant differences between students that might be related with their 
attendance of for-profit charter schools. At the same time, Sass uses longitudinal data (1999-2002) to 
control for students’ prior achievement and rule out that the observed relationship between school switches 
and performance is endogenous. The author does so by estimating the causes of switching with a probit 
model, controlling for four years of prior achievement, student characteristics and charter school 
competition, finding no correlation between prior changes in student achievement and school switches. 
In 2002, a significant number of underperforming public schools in Philadelphia were contracted out 
to for-profit and non-profit Education Management Organisations (EMOs) and funded through public 
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vouchers. Multiple studies have assessed the reform’s results, arriving at different conclusions regarding 
the performance of for-profit schools. Conducting a difference-in-differences analysis using student and 
school fixed effects, Peterson and Chingos (2008), find that students whose schools were taken over by 
for-profit providers improved their mathematics performance compared to those remaining in public 
schools three to four years after the reform, while students whose schools were given to non-profit 
managers did worse. Using individual-level, rather than school-level achievement data, Byrnes (2009) 
studied the same intervention in Philadelphia. Like Peterson and Chingos (2008), the study compares 
differences between the pre- and post-intervention performance across school types. In contrast to the 
previous study, Byrnes (2009) concludes that students whose schools were taken over by private non-profit 
or for-profit providers improved less in both reading and mathematics than students in public or 
district-managed (ORS) schools. 
Given that the privatised schools in Philadelphia were not chosen at random and had a significantly 
lower baseline-achievement than other public schools, the impact of the reform could easily be overstated 
since schools that are already doing well have less room for improvement. Peterson and Chingos (2008) try 
to adjust for these baseline-differences by restricting the public comparison group to district schools in the 
lower-half of the achievement scale. However, important uncontrolled differences between for-profit, 
non-profit and the selected district schools remain regarding their ethnic composition and their proportion 
of disadvantaged students. Furthermore, differences in the schools’ characteristics are only measured at the 
start of the intervention, which means that differential changes in the schools’ student composition over 
time remain uncontrolled. 
Byrnes (2009), on the other hand, does not select a comparison group of similar public schools but 
adds time-varying controls for school characteristics such as the proportion of minority and low-income 
students. Furthermore, Byrnes uses a longer period of time (6 compared to 2 years) to calculate the public 
schools’ achievement growth rate prior to the intervention, which puts him in a better position to draw 
valid inferences from the difference-in-differences analysis. 
Neither of the two studies can fully account the fact that both EMOs and ORS received higher per 
student funding than the regular district schools, which means that the different providers’ results cannot 
easily be compared in terms of cost-efficiency. It should also be taken into account that Philadelphia’s 
for-profit providers were large organisations operating in multiple states, while the non-profit providers 
had much less experience in running schools (Muir, 2012: 13f.). Although the findings of the Philadelphia 
reforms should be considered in the light of this specific context, neither of the two studies provides 
convincing evidence that for-profit providers systematically provide higher-quality education than public 
schools. Yet, neither do for-profit providers appear to fare worse than their non-profit counterparts. 
These results are congruent with a study of charter schools in Michigan, which yielded “virtually no 
evidence to suggest that the type of ownership of a charter school (profit or not-for-profit) affects the 
delivery of education services” (Hill and Welsch, 2009: 157). Since the analysis is conducted at the school 
level and the main explanatory variable (the ownership type) is time-invariant, the authors cannot use fixed 
effects to control for unobserved school characteristics affecting performance. Instead, they control for a 
number of observable features including the proportion of minority, female and low-income students, 
school size, and the student-teacher ratio. The study also takes into account the schools’ expenditure per 
student, finding no difference in the efficiency of non-profit and for-profit schools. Both types of 
educational providers led a similar proportion of Year 4 and 8 students to reach achievement level 1 or 2 in 
state-wide mathematics test between 2001 and 2004. The study suggests, however, that the quality of 
for-profit providers may differ according to their size. While there is some evidence that small for-profit 
companies (EMOs) are less efficient than non-profit voucher schools, the results of large for-profit 
companies were not significantly different from those of non-profit schools. Although these findings could 
theoretically be explained by unobserved student differences, it should be noted that for-profit charter 
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schools in Michigan are not allowed to engage in selective admission but have to assign places using a 
lottery system if they are oversubscribed. 
For-profit voucher schools in Sweden 
In a cross-sectional school-level analysis, Sahlgren (2011) finds Swedish for-profit and non-profit 
voucher schools to achieve higher average GPAs than public schools in Year 9. Controlling for 
characteristics of schools (student-teacher ratio, proportion of boys, level of parental education, proportion 
of immigrants, school size) and municipalities (average income, population density and average cost per 
student), the author argues that “non-profit independent schools raise the average GPA by 5.74 points, 
whereas the for-profit schools raise it by 4.50 points” compared to municipal schools (Sahlgren, 2011: 33). 
The study cannot control for the achievement of students prior to joining a for-profit school, which makes 
it difficult to estimate the value added by the school and to tackle the problems of endogeneity and 
selection bias. 
To address the problem of self-selection, the author adds a set of instrumental variables that are 
hypothesised to be exogenously related to the local availability of private schools, such as the proportion of 
children in private childcare and the proportion of ‘low-educated’ inhabitants (Sahlgren, 2011). Adding 
instrumental variables further increases the difference between municipal and private schools, while 
for-profit and non-profit schools were no longer different from each other. Since the dependent variable 
(GPA) reflects scores from national standardised tests as well as teacher-assigned marks, the results may 
be affected by differential mark inflation or marking standards across school sectors. Indeed, these 
concerns have been substantiated by Vlachos (2010) who finds mark inflation to be more pronounced in 
for-profit private schools than elsewhere when comparing upper-secondary school marks with standardised 
test scores (cited in Wondratschek et al., 2013). A recent study also found more general evidence of mark 
inflation among independent schools since their marks were more likely to be lowered upon 
re-examination by independent markers (Hinnerich and Vlachos, 2013, cited in Epple, Romano and 
Urquiola, 2015). This corroborates earlier findings by Wikström and Wikström (2005), who found strong 
evidence of mark inflation when comparing the marks of independent school students with scores from the 
standardised SweSAT test in the late 1990s. 
For-profit voucher schools in Chile 
Most studies of for-profit school performance in Chile have been conducted prior to recent reforms, at 
a time when for-profit schools were eligible for public funding, while at the same time engaging in 
selective admission and charging add-on tuition fees. Chumacero and Paredes (2008) compare student 
achievement in for-profit, private non-profit and public schools in Chile using 2005 SIMCE test results of 
Year 4 students. 34% of the students in the sample went to mostly subsidised for-profit schools and 17% 
went to subsidised private non-profit schools. In terms of raw test data, non-profit schools perform on 
average 13 points better than subsidised for-profit schools, although for-profit schools still outperform 
public schools by an average of 16 points and unsubsidised private schools have the highest test scores of 
all school types. Controlling for students’ socio-economic characteristics (including parental education, 
income and expenditure on education) as well as school characteristics (including location and selectivity), 
the differences become smaller but remain significant. 
Other studies using similar OLS regression techniques with school or individual level controls have 
generally shown the for-profit sector to perform worse than both the public and the non-profit voucher 
sector. Controlling for school location and aggregate student characteristics (parental attainment and socio-
economic background), McEwan and Carnoy (2000) find non-religious voucher schools (most of which 
are run for profit) to perform worse in Spanish and mathematics between 1990 and 1996 than public 
DAEM schools. Since the study does not effectively address the potential bias resulting from private 
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schools’ selection on ability, the authors consider their estimates to be an “upper bound to private school 
effects” and thus a conservative estimate of the public school advantage (McEwan and Carnoy, 2000: 223). 
McEwan and Carnoy’s (2000) study is one of the few to take into account measures of the schools’ 
resource inputs and approximate expenditure per student, which allows them to analyse differences in 
cost-efficiency across school types: Holding achievement and student background constant, non-religious 
(for-profit) voucher schools cost 13% to 17% less than public schools, which might be explained by their 
greater autonomy to set teacher wages, class sizes and manage infrastructure investments. The authors also 
show that resource decisions concerning the number of teacher hours per class, the proportion of 
contracting staff and teachers without university degree or holding a second job elsewhere account for the 
lower performance of for-profit schools. This lends some support to the concern that commercial providers 
compete in the educational market primarily “by cutting costs, rather than significantly raising academic 
achievement” (McEwan and Carnoy, 2000: 228). 
McEwan (2001) addresses the potential bias stemming from the selection of students on unobserved 
variables by applying a two-stage correction model modified for the choice between six alternative school 
types. In addition to individual-level controls for student and peer attributes, the study therefore adds an 
instrumental variable (the density of different school types in each municipality), which is hypothesised to 
affect the likelihood of school attendance independent of the students’ ability. Controlling for individual 
and peer socio-economic characteristics, the author finds for-profit non-religious voucher schools to fare 
worse in Year 8 Spanish and mathematics assessments than the public DAEM schools, while Catholic 
voucher schools score slightly higher (McEwan, 2001: 124). Accounting for the effect of selectivity 
(although it is not always statistically significant itself) further reduces the differences between private and 
public schools. 
Using a similar method to addresses the issue of selectivity, Elacqua (2011) uses a Heckman 
two-stage procedure to correct for parental self-selection on unobserved characteristics. Based on Spanish 
and mathematics SIMCE test scores of Year 4 students (2002, 2005 and 2006) and Year 8 students (2004), 
the study yields mixed results on the for-profit sector’s performance. For-profit private schools do not 
consistently outperform either non-profit private or public schools. Instead, the author finds significant 
variation across different types of commercial providers, depending on whether they were run as part of a 
franchise or independently. While franchise schools perform better than public schools, independent 
for-profit providers do not and are outperformed by most non-profit private schools. These differences may 
reflect that franchise schools benefit from economies of scale and that “being embedded in a larger 
organization reduces and facilitates the flow of information (such as research on best practices) between 
the schools in a franchise” (Elacqua, 2011: 24). As the author acknowledges, though, it could also be the 
case that high-achieving schools were more likely to join a franchise or attract enough students and 
resources to expand their operation in the first place. 
7.5.2 Competition from for-profit schools 
Allowing government-dependent schools to operate for profit would create additional incentives for 
private providers to enter the market or expand their capacity. Depending on the performance of the 
for-profit, non-profit and public sectors, changes to their relative size could have a positive or negative 
effect on the school system’s aggregate performance. In addition to these compositional changes, 
proponents of for-profit schools argue that their entry into the educational market would introduce 
educational and managerial innovations, stimulate inter-school competition, and improve school quality 
across sectors through the spread of successful practices. 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2015) test the effect of competition using Swedish regional-level data from 
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for Year 8 students in 1995, 2003 and 
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2007. The authors exploit regional variation in the expansion of independent schools across Swedish 
municipalities following the 1992 reform in order to identify the effect of competition from different 
school providers. Controlling for mark inflation and pre-reform trends, they find that the effect on public 
schools’ performance does not vary depending on the ownership-type of the schools they are competing 
with. Higher levels of competition from both for-profit and non-profit private schools are shown to have a 
positive effect on the outputs and outcomes of public schools. Yet, these effects are much smaller than 
estimated in previous studies and were only visible around a decade after the 1992 reform (Böhlmark and 
Lindahl, 2015). 
Competition effects in Sweden have tended to be more positive than those observed in Chile (Hsieh 
and Urquiola, 2006), which is consistent with the theoretical expectations elaborated above. Since 
restrictions on admission practices and add-on tuition fees make it more difficult for Swedish for-profit 
schools to cream skim high-ability students, they are more likely to compete on the basis of educational 
quality. At the same time, as predicted by formal school choice models that incorporate reputation effects 
(e.g. MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009) Swedish parents might have therefore attached greater importance to a 
school’s value added than its peer composition. 
7.5.3 Inequities of for-profit schooling 
The theoretical literature has generated different hypotheses regarding the implications of the 
profit-motive for selection practices and student sorting. Where for-profit schools can manipulate their 
student intake using tuition fees or selective admission, they may cream skim high-ability and high-income 
students in order to gain a competitive advantage over public schools, increase their revenues and lower 
their expenditure per student. By contrast, others have predicted for-profit schools to act as “bottom 
feeders”, offering low-quality education to economically disadvantaged students with high price 
sensitivity. 
Analysing panel data of Chilean students across schools and school sectors, Elacqua (2012) observes 
that public schools serve a larger proportion of students considered socio-economically “at risk” than 
non-profit or for-profit voucher schools, suggesting that “private voucher schools, particularly Catholic 
schools, respond to market incentives by focusing on a more elite student body” (Elacqua, 2012: 452). In 
addition, disadvantaged students are more segregated between for-profit schools than they are between 
non-profit schools, which suggests a stratification of student populations within the commercial sector. 
This is consistent with several theoretical simulations predicting for-profit schools to form a hierarchy with 
each targeting a specific segment of the student population (e.g. Epple and Romano, 2008). 
Since Elacqua (2012) does not take into account the effect of residential segregation, it remains 
unclear how much of the observed student sorting is caused by parents’ and schools’ selection practices, 
and how much of it merely reflects pre-existing patterns of socio-economic inequality. However, a 
longitudinal analysis indicates that the introduction of targeted vouchers in 2008 led to a decrease in 
between-school segregation across all sectors, which suggests that disadvantaged students were now more 
likely to take up places in school from which they had previously been excluded. Nevertheless, the authors 
find schools’ tuition policies to be a stronger predictor of student segregation than their profit-motive, 
which indicates that fees constitute the more significant barrier to entry than a school’s profit incentive 
alone, although the further may of course be a consequence of the latter. 
Several other studies have made use of instrumental variables to identify the role of student selection 
in the performance of for-profit schools. Although McEwan (2001) cannot convincingly reject the 
null-hypothesis of no selection bias due to large standard errors, accounting for the effect of selectivity 
reduced the performance of for-profit and most other private schools relative to public schools. Another 
study, using the Heckman two-stage procedure and private school density as an instrumental variable to 
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control for demand-side selectivity, yields no significant differences between the “parental selection bias” 
in for-profit and non-profit private schools (Elacqua, 2011: 21). 
7.6 Limitations and future research 
Even in school systems with a significant commercial sector, most studies of private education fail to 
distinguish between non-profit and for-profit providers. Future research should address this shortcoming 
and investigate variation across these sub-sectors whenever possible. Furthermore, few studies have 
investigated differences in schools’ expenditure per student by ownership types, as well as the effect of 
competition from for-profit schools on aggregate educational expenditure. Although there is some evidence 
vindicating the concern that for-profit schools may cut costs at the expense of educational quality, more 
research along these lines will be necessary to evaluate arguments concerning the efficiency of for-profit 
schools and to estimate the systemic cost of funding for-profit education. To better understand the 
performance variation across different types of commercial providers, we would also need to know more 
about their reasons and incentives for entering the market and creating specific arrangements such as 
chains or franchises. 
It should also be noted that studies comparing the effectiveness of for-profit and non-profit schools 
have so far squarely focussed on student test-scores and other measures of achievement reflecting the 
schools’ short-term educational outputs. As is the case in the wider literature on school choice, there is 
little evidence on the longer term outcomes of for-profit schooling such as graduation rates, transitions to 
tertiary education, or returns in the labour market. Particularly since for-profit schools have sometimes 
been accused of privileging short-term profit over their students’ long-term returns to education, it would 
be important for future research to investigate a wider range of educational outcomes. 
7.7 Conclusion: For-profit providers 
Although there is a growing and increasingly sophisticated literature comparing private and public 
schools in general, empirically robust insights into the performance and competitive behaviour of for-profit 
schools remain scarce. Based on our review, the international evidence on the performance of for-profit 
schools is both limited and mixed. In contexts where they were allowed to employ selective admission 
criteria, as seen in pre-reform Chile, for-profit schools have tended to be outperformed by non-profit 
private schools and have not performed considerably better than traditional public schools. Where 
for-profit schools were not allowed to select students, e.g. in Sweden, differences in the effectiveness of 
for-profit and non-profit schools have tended to be less pronounced and early studies have suggested 
for-profit schools to outperform public schools. Yet, the observed differences are rather small and 
potentially confounded by differential grading practices. 
Most studies of for-profit US charter schools with open enrolment policies, have found little or no 
differences between their performance and that of non-profit or public schools. Yet, both in Chile and 
the United States, some evidence suggests that the capacity of for-profit schools to deliver high quality 
education may be contingent on their organisational structure and experience. Given the small number of 
cases and significant variation across country-specific contexts, one should be careful when trying to 
generalise the conclusions that can be drawn based on these findings. However, it is clear that there is no 
consistent evidence for the claim that funding for-profit schools alone is an effective and reliable way to 
increase student achievement. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 As school choice is an increasingly common feature of OECD education systems, the regulation of 
publicly funded private schools has become a salient concern for researchers and policy makers alike. 
Focussing on three areas of regulation – selective admission, add-on tuition fees and for-profit ownership – 
this paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature concerning their implications for 
equity and educational effectiveness. Although important questions are yet to be addressed, existing 
research indicates great variation in the success of school choice programmes and confirms that regulatory 
policies can make an important contribution to the equity and educational effectiveness of publicly funding 
private schools. 
The international evidence suggests that schools practicing selective admission tend to attract students 
with higher ability and socio-economic status, regardless of their educational quality. Given that 
high-ability students are less costly to educate and can increase a school’s attractiveness to parents, 
controlling their intake can provide schools with a competitive advantage. Allowing private schools to 
select their students therefore provides them with an incentive to compete on the basis of exclusiveness 
rather than their value added, which can undermine the dynamics of competition diminish the positive 
effects it may otherwise have on quality. The evidence also points to selective admission as a source of 
increased inequality and stratification. There are, however, few studies investigating whether these effects 
vary across different selection criteria, for example parental interviews compared to aptitude tests. 
Likewise, the relative impact of selective admission policies and their interaction with other barriers to 
entry remain to be explored in more depth. Another important finding borne out by the literature is that 
student sorting occurs not only based on explicit admission criteria but also based on parental 
self-selection, selective expulsion and more subtle barriers to entry. Policies seeking to reduce segregation 
should therefore also identify and address overly complex application procedures, expulsion practices, 
information deficits and other factors that prevent some students from exercising school choice. 
Allowing publicly funded private schools to charge add-on tuition fees has been argued to give them 
an unfair advantage over public schools and undermine the principle of free school choice. Like selective 
admission, substantial add-on fees among private schools threaten to cream skim students from the public 
sector and increase educational inequalities. However, although some policy interventions that limited fees 
for low-income families have proven effective in reducing segregation, few empirical studies in developed 
countries have isolated the effect of fees from that of selective admission and other confounding factors. 
Furthermore, relatively little is known about the amount at which parental contributions start to deter 
lower-income families from attending subsidised private schools. However, both simulations and empirical 
evidence confirm that public funding may fail to widen access to private schools unless it is accompanied 
by restrictions on tuition fees. If private schools invest public resources to improve their quality – rather 
than to widen access – subsidies can exacerbate inequities across school sectors. This is one of the reasons 
why abolishing substantial add-on fees, alongside measures such as targeted vouchers, can be an effective 
means to reduce achievement gaps between students of higher and lower socio-economic status. 
As predicted by theoretical models, the performance of publicly funded for-profit schools appears to 
be highly dependent on the regulatory framework in which they are embedded. Based on the limited 
empirical evidence from OECD countries, for-profit schools that were allowed to select their students 
(e.g. in pre-reform Chile) did not consistently outperform public schools and had lower average results 
than their private non-profit counterparts. Where for-profit schools practiced open admissions 
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(e.g. in Sweden), differences in their effectiveness were less pronounced and early studies even suggested 
that they exceeded public schools, although these results may have been caused by differential grading 
practices. Well-identified studies have also found little or no differences between the performance of 
US non-selective charter schools running for profit and that of non-profit private or public schools. 
However, both in Chile and the United States, evidence suggests that the capacity of for-profit schools to 
deliver high-quality education may be contingent on factors such as their organisational structure and 
experience, which highlights the importance of well-designed accountability and accreditation 
mechanisms. While the evidence on the performance of for-profit schools is not as equivocally negative as 
their critics suggest, there is no strong evidence to support the claim that funding for-profit providers in 
itself constitutes an effective way to increase aggregate student achievement. 
The study of school choice programmes faces a range of methodological challenges from 
self-selection bias and unobserved school inputs to endemic data limitations regarding tuition and 
admission practices. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the three substantive areas of this 
review – selective admission, add-on tuition fees and for-profit ownership – are closely interconnected: 
Allowing publicly funded for-profit schools to charge tuition fees can result in the retention of public 
subsidies and parental resources, rather than a corresponding increase in educational access or quality. 
Likewise, allowing subsidised private schools to engage in selective admission can subvert efforts to 
improve equity by restricting add-on tuition fees. While this constitutes a challenge for the empirical 
identification of individual policies’ effects, it highlights the importance of taking a holistic approach to the 
regulation of publicly funded private schools. Given the considerable heterogeneity within the subsidised 
private sector, a meaningful expansion of the evidence base would also benefit from more consistently 
investigating variation across schools with different tuition policies, admission processes and ownership 
models. 
Despite recent methodological advances and a growing body of research, it is clear that some central 
questions concerning the funding of private education are yet to be convincingly addressed. So far, the 
majority of studies have evaluated the regulation of private schools with respect to a rather narrow set of 
outputs, focusing on standardised test scores and other measures of short-term student outcomes. 
Investigating how selective admission and for-profit provision affect longer-term outputs, such as 
graduation rates, educational transitions or returns in the labour market, but also behavioural and non-
cognitive outcomes, remains an important research issue. The same goes for exploring how regulatory 
policies impact students at different points on the socio-economic or ability distribution, minorities and 
students with special educational needs. While the literature has become increasingly sophisticated in 
comparing the relative performance of public and private schools under different regulatory regimes, the 
system-wide costs of such policies and their aggregate impact on educational outcomes are subject to 
complex dynamics which have largely evaded empirical analysis. Addressing these gaps in the literature 
calls for the continued improvement of theoretical models, empirical evidence and identification strategies. 
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